Changing Firms, and a Brief Note on the Right of Service Providers to Make a Profit

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Class Actions , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , People are Talking . . .
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So, some of you may have noticed a change on the masthead at the top of this blog, which notes that I am now at the Wagner Law Group , in its Boston office. It has been a pleasure litigating ERISA and business disputes for the past nearly quarter century at the McCormack Firm, but every now and then an old dog needs to do a new trick. More seriously, for the past several years, I have been increasingly called on by clients to assist with DOL investigations and to handle plan deficiencies and other problems, all outside of the litigation context. The Wagner Law Group, with its deep bench and broad expertise in all areas of ERISA governed benefit plans, gives me the opportunity to provide those services more extensively to my clients, while continuing my litigation practice, which is heavily oriented towards breach of fiduciary duty and other ERISA disputes. So not only was the timing right, but so is the fit.

If you want more information on my changing firms, you can find the press release on my joining the Wagner Law Firm here. When I read it myself for the first time, I immediately thought of a line a U.S. Senator I once heard speak liked to use immediately after being glowingly introduced, which was: “thanks for the kind introduction, which my father would have appreciated and my mother would have believed.”

With that out of the way, I wanted to turn to one brief, substantive discussion. Eric Berkman has a fine article out in Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, in which he quotes me on the First Circuit’s decision in Merriman v. Unum Life, which rejected claims that a retained asset account structure for paying life insurance benefits under an ERISA governed plan violated ERISA. In one of my quotes, I explained that:

"The plaintiffs' bar is looking for ways defendants are making money or making these services profitable and calling them prohibited transactions or breaches of fiduciary duty," Rosenberg said. "But this case, which falls in line with cases in other contexts, is saying that as long as the plan beneficiary is getting everything he or she is supposed to be getting under the plan, it's OK that the insurance company or other service provider is also making a profit."

While there are a lot of technical issues to Merriman, I think this is the important takeaway if one is looking at the forest rather than the trees. Across the benefit industry, service providers have to turn a profit; if they don’t, we will quickly not have a benefit industry. The holdings in cases like Merriman, which found the payment structure appropriate even though it could create some additional profit for the insurer, drive home the point that, so long as there is no prohibited transaction or misuse of plan assets or other illegal behavior, its okay for service providers and insurers to turn a profit.
 

More on the Golf Course RFP

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , ERISA Seminars and other Resources , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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Susan Mangiero, one of my favorite experts on financial deals and transactions, was kind enough to post on my presentation to the Boston Regional Office of the Department of Labor, where I spoke on common mistakes by plan sponsors. I spoke as part of a day long training program that Susan presented at as well, even if she was too modest to mention it in her post, and I was very pleased and impressed by the audience, their participation and their questions. I have written before that I generally hold a high opinion of the Department’s staff, and the audience participation at the training session did nothing to lessen that opinion. Both in my primary talk, on plan sponsor mistakes, and during a subsequent panel that I participated in on litigation issues, fee disputes, and fiduciary governance of plans, the audience raised great points and asked pointed questions. One member of the audience shared with me an additional important mistake plan sponsors make, that I had not previously thought of as a significant problem, primarily because it is not one that arises in litigation but is instead more of a day to day compliance issue. There is nothing better as a speaker than having walked away having learned something from the audience that you did not know the day before.

Susan’s reference to the “Golf Course RFP,” which actually is a slide in my PowerPoint deck, concerns one of my chief cautions to smaller and mid-size companies, where benefit plans, particularly 401(k)/mutual fund programs, may be chosen by a company owner simply based on the vendors that are already in the owner’s social circle, such as, yes, those at his or her country club. If it turns out down the road that employees were paying too much for or getting too little from the plan, in comparison to what could have been located in the marketplace as a whole at that time, picking a plan’s vendor in that manner will most certainly come back to bite the company owner. Indeed, from a trial lawyer’s perspective, such a selection process would, in a fiduciary duty lawsuit over that plan, be a smoking gun used to show poor processes and a corresponding breach of a fiduciary duty. At the end of the day, RFPs aren’t normally conducted on a golf course, and this is one area of business life where it is especially important to remember that.
 

Excessive Fee Litigation Remains a Hot Topic

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Class Actions , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , Standard of Review
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There’s a nice overview from Bloomberg BNA on plan fee litigation, and its status in the courts at this point in time. The article opens up by setting the stage:

Plan fee litigation had a big year in 2013, with divisive appellate court decisions affecting standards of judicial review, statutes of limitations and functional fiduciary status that may open the door for increased and novel litigation, employee benefits attorneys said during a conference panel presentation.

Its interesting to read the rest of the article, which summarizes the current status of cases such as Tibble and Leimkuehler, and discusses the totally conflicting views of the defense bar and the plaintiffs’ bar over these cases. If there were ever a case of two sides not being able to agree on whether it is day or night, it is the two sides of the bar arguing over the propriety of judicial decisions over ERISA liability, particularly with regard to excessive fee litigation. I thought there was a divide bordering on the ecumenical decades ago, in my earlier life as an insurance coverage litigator (which I still sometimes am, when not busy with ERISA fiduciary problems or other types of litigation) between policyholder and insurer lawyers over oddities like the asbestosis exclusion, the meaning of the words “expected or intended,” or what the words “sudden and accidental” actually mean, but they had nothing on the current divide between the plaintiff and defense bars when it comes to high stakes ERISA litigation (a division I wrote about at length here).

Substantively, though, the best takeaway from the article comes in its last line, in a quote from someone with the Department of Labor, who notes on one particular issue raised by the fee cases that it is “an interesting issue, and I don't think we've heard the last of it.” One can say that across the board about all of the excessive fee litigation, and its spin off of other types of cases all targeting the question of whether plan participants are paying more than they should for plan benefits. Tibble itself is a wonderful example of the extent to which excessive fee litigation is a gift that keeps on giving, of a sort, for everyone from the lawyers involved, to plan participants (in those instances where they either obtain a recovery as part of a class or receive the incidental benefit of having lower plan expenses because sponsors are responding to the threat, real or perceived, of excessive fee litigation), and, yes, commentators. I wrote substantially about Tibble way back at the trial court level, in 2011, and here we still are, these many years later, writing and talking about the further history of that case.
 

The Fiduciary Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege: What It Is and Why It Matters

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Class Actions , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , Percentage Players Die Broke Too: Notes on Litigation and Trial Tactics
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One of the great advantages a Massachusetts ERISA litigator has is that our federal magistrate judges are very good with ERISA issues, which is something that is well illustrated by this decision on the scope of the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in ERISA litigation. In Kenney v. State Street, the magistrate judge dealt, in a very clean and easily understood manner, with the key issues that come into play under that doctrine, which have to do with its borders: to be exact, what attorney-client communications are subject to disclosure under this exception, and what ones are not. This is a more complicated issue of line drawing than it might appear at first glance because, in essence, you are considering the same course of communications, between the same lawyers and the same plan representatives, dealing with the same general topic (the plan’s operations), sometimes as part of the same in-person meeting, and deciding where the line falls as to the communications that must be produced and those that do not have to be produced.

The takeaway from Kenney on this line drawing is summarized nicely in this blog post by an unidentified Paul Hastings lawyer or two:

First, the attorney-client privilege is available for settlor matters, such as "adopting, amending, or terminating an ERISA plan" because those decisions do not involve ERISA fiduciary functions of managing or administering the plan.
Second, the attorney-client privilege is available to a plan fiduciary who seeks the advice of counsel in response to a threat of litigation by plan beneficiaries (or the government) against the fiduciary.

This is not an issue, by the way, that is just of academic interest, or something for clients and litigators to be concerned about after the fact, when a lawsuit is pending. A few years back there was a major top hat plan case in which some of the key evidence relied upon by the plaintiff consisted of emails and communications between the plan sponsor and its lawyers that were discoverable under these standards: that evidence was very helpful to the plaintiff, and was information that simply should not have been communicated in the manner it was (without, for instance, context and qualification) if it was ever going to see the light of day, rather than being forever cloaked behind the attorney-client privilege. Plans and their outside ERISA lawyers, who on a day to day basis in establishing and running a plan are typically not litigators, need to remember that their communications can end up in a courtroom in later litigation that cannot even be foreseen at the time of the communications in question, and should be careful with regard to the accuracy, context, phrasings and tone of such communications as a result.
 

Why Amara's Expansion of Remedies Matters Now, But Not So Much in the Long Term

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In ERISA Seminars and other Resources , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Equitable Relief , Summary Plan Descriptions
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My small group of dedicated twitter followers know I was live tweeting last week from ACI’s ERISA Litigation conference in New York, at least for the first day of the conference. Tweeting allowed me to pass along ideas from the speakers and my own thoughts on their points in real time, which was, frankly, a lot of fun for me (if you haven’t tried live tweeting from an event, you should; it turns being an attendee watching others speak on a topic into a much more interactive and engaged experience). At the same time, though, its fair to say that many of the topics discussed by the panelists, and many of my own thoughts on those topics, don’t neatly fit within 140 characters, so I thought I would post some more detailed take aways from the conference, starting today.

One of the things that jumped out at me at the conference was the fact that the ERISA defense bar has clearly coalesced around the idea that Amara is a bad thing and that the expansion of equitable remedies set into motion by that opinion is objectionable. Even though I am, at least 80% of the time, a member of that defense bar, I think that’s a bit harsh and an overreaction. It does not strike me that the consensus defense bar view articulates a particularly substantial argument for why the Court was wrong to expand that remedy. At the end of the day, most of that remedial expansion – in the forms of reformation, estoppel and surcharge – is directed at only one phenomenon, which is the circumstance in which there is a disjunct between what a plan actually says and what is communicated to plan participants through summary plan descriptions, human resources employees, or other sources (though I have no illusions that participants and their lawyers won’t find ways to try to extend those remedies to other types of circumstances as well). To the extent that employees can show actual harm to them from that error (and by this I do not mean just being deprived of some legal right under ERISA or some hypothetical opportunity to act in response to learning the correct information, but rather some showing of actual concrete out of pocket loss to them), there is no reason they should be without a remedy, and the expansion of remedies in Amara prevents that otherwise all too common outcome.

As one of the prominent in-house attorneys speaking at the conference noted, the nature of ERISA is that the bar for proper performance by plan sponsors and administrators keeps rising, and that is as it should be: one panelist made the point that what is a best practice today in running a plan, will simply be the standard practice that must be lived up to tomorrow. This is all that Amara’s targeting of communication errors by imposing equitable remedies for them will really do in the end: make accurate participant communications a crucially important part of running a plan. As plan administrators raise their game in this regard (making what is today a best practice the standard in this regard in the future), these remedies and the Amara decision itself will become relatively unimportant, and people will come to wonder why there was so much defense bar hue and cry over Amara in the first place.
 

Opening Up the Courthouse Door: The Second Circuit Weighs in on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Employee Benefit Plans
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If one theme has emerged from my numerous blog posts over the last seven years and across the various articles I have written on ERISA litigation during that time span, it is the centrality of operational competence in sponsoring and administering ERISA plans. I have, for instance, often argued that, when it comes to ERISA litigation, the best offense for plan sponsors and company officers is a good defense, in the form of what I have taken to calling defensive plan building; defensive plan building is the idea that taking careful and precise steps in building out, and then running, pensions, 401(k)s, ESOPs, and other plans creates the optimal environment for defending against lawsuits down the road related to those plans. When one can document a careful process for selecting vendors, for picking funds, for the fees attached to plans, for the handling of float income, and for all the other myriad choices that must be made with regard to how a plan will operate, it becomes relatively easy to defend fiduciaries and company officers alleged to be fiduciaries against breach of fiduciary duty actions, because these types of documents and steps demonstrate a prudent process.

Likewise, there has been a clear trend in the case law over those years, directly reflected in my posts and writings, towards the loosening of the procedural and substantive advantages held by plans, sponsors and fiduciaries. These shifts run from the subtle – such as a tendency for courts to now look much more closely at medical evidence in benefit cases, even where arbitrary and capricious review applies – to the bold, such as the Supreme Court’s expansion of equitable remedies in Amara. All of these shifts have this in common: they decrease the likelihood of a fiduciary or sponsor winning early in a case on procedural grounds, and increase the likelihood that a court will eventually reach the merits of a claim. Excessive fee litigation provides a ready example, as we have shifted, in just a few years, from early and relatively easy procedural victories for defendants in those types of cases to substantial settlements and the occasional outright trial victory for participants. What does this have to do with operational competency in operating a plan? It makes competency in running the plan ever more important, because it increases the likelihood that a court will someday consider the merits in a lawsuit targeting those actions, rather than the case ending, as it often would have in the past, at an early point in the litigation on procedural or highly technical grounds.

My latest published article, “Opening Up the Courthouse Door: The Second Circuit
Weighs in on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
,” addresses this idea in another context, namely the weakening, in a recent Second Circuit opinion, of the requirement of administrative exhaustion as a defense against ERISA actions. As I discussed in the article, for many years, this defense was a solid bulwark against many ERISA claims, one that could often stop a suit long before the parties or the court would get to the merits of an action. Indeed, historically, participants who tried to argue their way around this requirement rarely succeeded. The Second Circuit, however, as I discuss in the article, substantially weakened that defense and opened up a new line of attack for participants faced with the claim that they had not exhausted their administrative remedies before the plan administrator. As I discuss in the article, it is yet another example of courts making it easier for participants to prosecute ERISA claims and, in particular, to leapfrog the type of early procedural defenses that defendants used to be able to use to stop many such claims in their tracks at a very early stage. Anything that makes it easier for participants to get the merits of a lawsuit in front of a court increases the importance of competence in running the plan, because it is the level of operational competence that will be on trial once a court gets to the merits of an action.
 

CalPERS and Passive Investing: A Couple of Thoughts

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , Pensions
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I have had a couple of interesting conversations recently about CalPERS considering going to index/passive investing. As I have noted in the past, if a major and highly influential pension fund goes that route, how long will it be until others follow, seeking both safety in numbers and the potential defense to breach of fiduciary duty claims of pointing to CalPERS’ decision as reflecting an industry-wide standard of reasonableness?

Two questions have come up in that event, however, in recent conversations I have had. First, how long will it be until fiduciaries who switch their plans to index and passive funds are sued by participants claiming they would have done better under actively managed funds, and that, given the make up of the particular participant base for that plan and their investment objectives, active investing was the prudent course? Second, and more fun/theoretical, is this: what happens when everyone follows along and goes index only? Who do you trade with on the other side of the deal, and what – if everyone is just moving along with the market index – drives the price one way or the other, when there is no one out there buying and selling in the hope of beating that index?

Both are simply theoretical concerns to a certain extent, and mostly entertaining thought experiments. But still, one has to wonder whether index investing can really be the answer to everything, in all circumstances. Seems to me that once upon a time all the funds in my 401k all held internet stocks at the same time to boost their returns, even when their stated investment objectives wouldn’t have called for those holdings, and that uniformity of approach didn’t work out too well for anyone. Maybe let a thousand flowers bloom in investment choices and approaches, anyone? Isn’t that what diversification is supposed to be – holding different categories of investments, selected in different approaches, rather than all holding the same portions of an index, all moving in lock step? One has to wonder.
 

The Lessons of Detroit for Private Sector Retirement Plans

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans , Pensions , Retirement Benefits
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Much has been written over the years about the transition of employees from pension plans to 401(k)s by private industry over the past decade or so, with pensions disappearing and the obligation to fund – and risk of underfunding retirement – passed to employees. There is much to be said both for and against this change, but the fact that it is underway and effectively irreversible cannot be disputed; the numbers document the former, and reality establishes the latter.

There are instances, as I suggested was the case with First Data the other day, where changes that transfer risk to employees clearly seem to be driven by the short term financial interests of investors and ownership, but generally speaking, those are outlier events when it comes to this shift in retirement funding. More often, in my view, what you have seen are viable companies that are serious about their talent pool nonetheless making shifts in this direction to ensure the long run health and future of those firms, which is at least as important to the future retirement opportunities of their employees as the continuation of pensions would have been. For a number of reasons, which I won’t discuss in detail here, companies have found such a change necessary to achieve the arguably greater good of ensuring that, in the long run, they can continue to provide good jobs at good wages, in the old formulation, having found that this socially important good is put at risk by promising to fund distant pensions.

Detroit’s bankruptcy, as has other municipal bankruptcies, demonstrates the importance of managing retirement risk for employers, and the manner in which the failure to do so in a timely manner can spell disaster down the road, for both the employer and its retired employees. Detroit’s bankruptcy is driven in large part by almost $9.2 billion (yes, that’s billion, with a B) in pension and other retirement benefits that the city cannot afford to pay – something which is putting its retirees, more than anyone else, in harm’s way. I acknowledge that comparing municipal pension problems with corporate, ERISA-governed retirement plans is a little bit of comparing apples to oranges, but the differences between the two scenarios can’t override the key similarity and take away: that ignorance by an employer of its ability long term to continue to make pension promises without regard to a future ability to pay is not bliss; that it is employees who suffer in the long run if companies don’t make changes necessary to create sustainable retirement plans rather than blindly promising pensions forevermore to employees; and that it is entirely appropriate for employers to find that elusive middle ground between contributing to retirement security for employees and the risk of taking on future obligations that the employer can’t promise it can meet, such as guaranteeing pensions.
 

The Lessons of First Data Corp's Suspension of 401(k) Contributions

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , ESOP , Employee Benefit Plans
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There is a fascinating story in today’s Wall Street Journal, about First Data Corp. abandoning the practice of making cash contributions to employee 401(k) accounts, as part of cost cutting clearly designed to make the company more profitable (or at least profitable enough) to hold an IPO, which would allow an exit for the leveraged buyout group that had acquired First Data but has so far failed to improve the company’s prospects. As the article explains, First Data is instead going to make stock awards to all employees, but apparently outside of the retirement plan format. As best as one can tell from the article, the stock grants to employees won’t be made as part of an ESOP or some other type of retirement plan account, although the article is not entirely clear on this point.

We have seen for years the abandonment of pensions in favor of 401(k)s and similar plans that remove long term funding and investment risks from the sponsor/employer, and transfer those obligations and risks to employees. That is old news. What is new, however, and both interesting and troubling about the First Data story, is that it takes that transitioning of retirement risk from a company to its employees one step further, by replacing the cash contribution by the plan sponsor with the entirely speculative and risky grant of private stock, for which there is not even a current public market. In so doing, First Data has gone one step beyond simply the transitioning of employee retirement risk to employees by means of 401(k) plans, by removing the certainty – and cost to the company – of cash contributions in favor of paper awards that do not increase the employees’ current retirement assets. There are multiple problems with this step, viewed from the prism of retirement policy. First, we have all long counseled employees against excessive reliance on company stock in retirement planning, and in fact, it is a common refrain in defending against ERISA stock drop cases that employees in many cases could have and should have diversified out of company stock, but did not do so. This change by First Data effectively forces employees to have less cash to use for diverse investments in their 401(k) plans in favor of holding, apparently outside of the retirement plan, a concentrated amount of company stock. Second, and related to this, the company is reducing the cash in employee 401(k) accounts at the same time that the market is doing well as a whole (generally speaking), reducing the employees’ ability to invest broadly and keep up with the market; instead, they get company stock which, according to the article, is becoming less and less valuable each day.

A related and to me, fascinating, note on this is the fact that the stock grants, as noted above, may not be made as part of an ESOP or otherwise within the context and confines of an ERISA governed plan. If this is so, then the plan sponsors will avoid the obligations and potential liabilities that come with fiduciary status, when it comes to the granting of the stock and company decisions that impact the value of the employees’ stock holdings down the line. This is a very interesting and subtle point that should not be overlooked, particularly since the company is basically a creature, at this point, of the leveraged buyout industry and the real purpose of the changes in question are clearly directed at future transactions that would allow the current major investors to cash out. If they keep the employee stock obligations out of any ERISA governed plan, including an ESOP, the fiduciary obligations imposed by ERISA will not be implicated in or by any future transactions designed to unwind the stakes of current ownership. If those stock grants are instead placed in ERISA protected plans, in contrast, ERISA’s fiduciary obligations will serve as a check on any future complex transaction involving the company’s stock that might negatively impact the value of stock held by employees, in circumstances where those same events might positively impact those with control over the company and the majority of its stock. Those of you who recall the tortured history of theChicago Tribune’s ESOP and its role in a complex corporate transaction will recognize this point, and the risks and benefits incumbent in the decision to keep, or not, the stock grants within an ERISA governed plan.
 

Do You Know a Governmental Plan When You See It?

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans
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Years ago, I worked with a client who liked to tell the story of having begun working with ERISA governed plans right after ERISA was enacted. He had been told by his bosses that there is this “new law,” and you are in charge of issues arising under it. That “new law,” of course, was ERISA. Little could he have known at that time that this “new law” would grow up, by force of preemption and the size of the benefits market, to control and govern an overwhelming slice of American life.

One of the stories I remember him telling me is about early attempts to determine whether something was or was not a governmental plan. Governmental plans, you may recall, are not subject to ERISA. Back then, as he told the story, he and others in the industry applied an “if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and talks like a duck “ test, meaning if it looked and felt like the plan related to a governmental entity, than it was a governmental plan. It was as good a standard as any, as you have to remember that, at the time, the extensive body of case law that now exists concerning ERISA plans had yet to be created.

Well, now we know better, after years of court decisions concerning ERISA plans, including whether or not a plan constitutes a governmental plan. Mike Reilly, over at the Boom blog (I just like writing Boom blog, for some reason), has the latest word on the subject, and on how, today, we determine whether or not a plan is a governmental plan. Hint: it’s a lot different and more technical than seeing if it walks like a duck.
 

My Journal of Pension Benefits Article on Operational Competence after Amara

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Benefit Litigation , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Equitable Relief , Fiduciaries , Summary Plan Descriptions
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For years, in speeches and articles, I have preached the gospel of what I have come to call “defensive plan building,” which is the process of systemically building out plan documents, procedures and operations in manners that will limit the likelihood of a plan sponsor or fiduciary being sued while increasing the likelihood that, if sued, they will win the case in the end. Over the past couple of years, doctrinal shifts related to remedies available to participants under ERISA have made defensive plan building even more important, for at least two reasons. First, these shifts have expanded the range of potential liabilities and exposure in offering, and running, a benefit plan. Second, these developments have, to a significant degree, given rise to an increased focus in ERISA litigation on the actual facts concerning the plan’s activities, as the lynchpin of the liability determination. The combination of expanding liability risks with an increased focus on plan actions makes it more important than ever to focus on the steps of defensive plan building, including by focusing on operational competence in running a benefit plan.

I discussed this concept in much greater detail in my recent article in the Journal of Pension Benefits, “Looking Closely at Operational Competence: ERISA Litigation Moves Away from Doctrine and Towards a Careful Review of Plan Performance.” The article discusses how the last several years of ERISA litigation, including in particular the Supreme Court’s recent activism in this realm, has created this phenomenon. You can find a much more fully realized presentation of these points in the article.
 

How to Look Smart About McCutchen and Heimeshoff Without Really Trying

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Equitable Relief , Health Insurance
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I have often joked that, to seem intelligent at social events, a person really just has to have two things handy – the first, a Noam Chomsky reference, and the second, a Shakespeare quote, preferably from a lesser play. If you are good, you can find a way to fit one or the other into any subject of conversation. Personally, I rely on “there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy” (which I also find is often an especially good rejoinder in court to legal arguments proffered by opposing counsel), and Chomsky’s media coverage study, when I am trapped in a conversation with no way out, but to each his own.

I was thinking of this when I read the Workplace Prof’s excellent and extensive blog post on the two latest developments at the Supreme Court concerning ERISA law, the first being the very recent decision in US Airways v. McCutchen, which I suspect will soon be reduced to the defense assertion that courts must always apply the plan terms as written, and the Court’s grant of cert in Heimeshoff v. Hartford, on the application of statute of limitations to benefit claims under ERISA. You don’t have to really study the source material on either of these cases to hold forth on them at this point, because you can just read the Prof’s post, and be all set to pontificate on them without a problem. Less tongue in cheek, it really is worth reading, if you want to understand, with a limited investment of time, what these two cases are about and why they matter.

I would also throw in, with regard to the opinion in McCutchen, two additional comments that you can borrow, if you really want to look erudite without doing any homework on your own first. One, it really is a well-written piece of work, taken simply as an example of the written form in the legal context, without regard to how one may feel about the merits of the decision. I would suggest it to connoisseurs of the form for a read, under any circumstances. Second, the case, although an ERISA decision, has an easy transition to the doctrines of insurance law, where subrogation and the impact of the common fund doctrine are in play on a routine basis; it adds additional support for any argument that the common fund doctrine should always apply in that circumstance. In this regard, feel free to drop a knowing reference to footnote 8, if you really want to appear in the know.
 

Some Thoughts on Kirkendall v. Halliburton

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Class Actions , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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I have passed along on Twitter (https://twitter.com/SDRosenbergEsq) some of the better reviews that have crossed my desk of the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Kirkendall v. Halliburton, Inc., in which the Court held that a plan participant did not have to exhaust administrative remedies in an ERISA plan where the plan document itself was unclear in imposing such an obligation. Frankly, I wasn’t sure the case itself warranted any more extensive discussion, because I don’t find the Court’s conclusion particularly unusual or controversial in any manner. That said, though, the amount of commentary the case has generated reminds me that, at the end of the day, the Second Circuit is like E.F. Hutton: when they talk, people listen. So to expand on my Twitter thoughts about the case, here are some more expansive thoughts, ones that require more than 140 letters to communicate.

The most important way of viewing the decision, in my thinking, is to remember that exhaustion of administrative remedies in this scenario is not a statutory requirement, and is instead a judge-made doctrine that is based on certain assumptions about ERISA plans and certain premises that are thought to be implicit in the statute. In practice, the imposition of an exhaustion of administrative remedies standard on ERISA claims has generally not been a problem, has worked well, and has been effective in effectuating many of the goals for the statute, such as cost efficiency, limited litigation, and encouraging employers to create benefit plans. That said, however, there is certainly no clear cut basis in the statute for believing that, if a plan sponsor doesn’t clearly communicate the need to appeal within the plan, a plan participant should be required to do so or be shown the courthouse door for having failed to do so. This is essentially all that the Second Circuit concluded: if the plan sponsor doesn’t make it clear to the participant in the relevant documents that certain internal administrative appeals are required, along with explaining how to do that, an obligation to do so cannot be imposed on a plan participant.

This is not a new issue, although the decision in Kirkendall may be the most significant authority to date for this proposition. I have litigated this issue in the past, but most often you see it in one-offs like top-hat plans (or virtual one-offs, like SERPs for just a few executives), where a custom document is created for certain employees to address compensation-related issues, and the ERISA procedural component of doing so is not front and center in the authoring attorney’s mind. Usually, the outcome of any dispute over administrative exhaustion in those situations ends up the same as the ruling by the Second Circuit in Kirkendall for all intents and purposes, but getting to that result is harder than just citing a leading decision from a prominent appellate bench; you instead had to rely on a collection of lower court decisions finding exhaustion to not be required for a multiple of different reasons. Certainly, at the end of the day, Kirkendall will make it easier for lawyers for plan participants faced with this scenario to support their arguments that they can prosecute a claim in court without first exhausting internal administrative appeals, but I don’t think it will much change the outcome from what would have occurred without that decision.
 

On Getting Out of the Pension Business

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , Pensions
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Nobody wants to be in the pension business anymore (other than, I guess, vendors who provide defined benefit plan services, annuities, etc. to plans and their sponsors). The Washington Post had an interesting article recently on the vanishing pension, and of course everyone who works in this field has long known that plan sponsors have been aggressively moving from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans for years. In fact, as I have discussed in other posts and address again in an upcoming feature article in the Journal of Pension Benefits, the most important aspect of the Supreme Court’s watershed decision a few years back in LaRue may very well not turn out to be the express grant to defined contribution plan participants of the right to sue for fiduciary breaches based only on harm to their own accounts, but the Court’s express recognition that the legal rules established over decades governing pension plans should not automatically be applied to defined contribution plans. All of this sturm und drang - and much more -is part and parcel of the death of the pension, at least in the private sector; economics are almost certain to eventually kill them in the public sector as well, given enough time.

But getting rid of pensions and out of the pension business, if you are the fiduciary of a pension plan, is not easy and not without legal risk, including of being sued for breach of fiduciary duty for taking that step. One of my favorite commentators on pension governance issues, Susan Mangiero, and ERISA litigator Nancy Ross provide an excellent overview of this point in this article on CFO.com. This subject has come up a lot recently in discussions with clients, potential clients, and other ERISA lawyers, and this article is a terrific introduction to the subject.
 

Amnesty and the Fee Disclosure Regulations

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Employee Benefit Plans
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I like this piece here on the question of whether investment and financial advisors who foul up their initial efforts to comply with the fee disclosure regulations should be given a mulligan, and allowed to effectively self-report and correct without penalty. The proposal is to have the Department of Labor essentially run yet another type of voluntary correction procedure, which would then insulate advisors who have erred in complying with the new rules. While I am not in favor of a complete free pass for mistakes, certainly the middle ground on the idea staked out by one commentator, Craig Watanabe of California’s Penniall & Associates, who favors amnesty for honest mistakes but not for those that rise (or – I guess more accurately – fall) to the level of negligence, has merit.. Why? Because its not the easiest thing to implement and comply with a new regulatory regime of this nature, and it seems fair to allow the regulated a chance to fix early, honest mistakes that occur in trying to properly comply; the same can’t be said for efforts to comply that are so lax, so without real intent to satisfy the new rules, and so poorly executed that they should be deemed negligent. I would also note that, since the justification given for the idea is the difficulty of early compliance, that the amnesty program, if created, ought to vanish after a year or so. If someone cannot get it right by then, they shouldn’t be trusted with all of the other complexities involved in handling and protecting workers’ retirements.

A Focus on Facts in the Seventh Circuit: George v. Junior Achievement of Central Indiana

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Retirement Benefits
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An upcoming article of mine in the Journal of Pension Benefits argues that ERISA litigation and potential exposures are moving away from strict constructionism and technical legal arguments to fact based inquiries into potential harms to participants, and traces how we came to that place. This is a more significant change than it may appear to any of you who do not spend your time litigating ERISA disputes. This shift is going to make ERISA litigation more like other litigation, with a focus on factual development and discovery, and less on doctrinal argument. The Seventh Circuit’s recent ruling in George v. Junior Achievement of Central Indiana, Inc., discussed in this excellent synopsis here, is a perfect example of this phenomenon, with the Court rejecting a technical, statutory basis for rejecting a retaliation claim under ERISA in favor of a broader reading of the relevant statutory language, one that can allow for a fact-based inquiry into whether or not the participant actually was retaliated against. You can expect more and more of this kind of shift in the future, across the range of issues impacting ERISA plans, particularly with regard to retirement benefits, whether provided under defined contribution or instead defined benefit plans.

Stephan v. Unum, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and the Need for Independent Counsel for Company Officers and Plan Fiduciaries

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Conflicts of Interest , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , Standard of Review
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Tidal Wave! Landslide! Look out below!

Pick out the metaphor of your choice, because Unum just got taken out behind the woodshed by the Ninth Circuit and spanked hard. Frankly, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is a rout in favor of the participant, and participants in general. In many ways, the case presented a perfect storm for such an overwhelming opinion against a long term disability carrier. The case involved: a very sympathetic plaintiff who suffered a horrible, fluke injury that most readers could sympathize with; a lot of money; and a long term disability carrier with a documented history of claim disputes that the court could point to in further support of its ruling. I have to tell you that the facts painted by the Ninth Circuit in this opinion, related to both the claim and the carrier, are clearly of an outlier event, one not representative of the handling of most claims by most long term disability carriers, or of most long term disability carriers at all, for that matter. Twenty years of experience tell me most attorneys representing participants would, even if only off the record, agree with that assessment.

Frankly, despite Unum’s own documented history with regard to claims handling, cited by the Ninth Circuit to support its opinion, I am not sure that the depiction of the carrier in this opinion is even representative of that carrier at this point in time, but I don’t know enough to comment knowingly in that regard.

More importantly though, and moving away from the overflowing kettle of clichés with which I deliberately chose to fill the first couple paragraphs of this post, it would be a shame if courts, participants, companies and their lawyers allowed the unusual nature of the case to become the focus of their attention. This is because there are several key takeaways from this case, some specific to long term disability cases and others, even more important, to ERISA litigation in general.

With regard to these types of benefit claims, one should look closely at the Court’s handling of the structural conflict of interest issue. The Court not only points toward significant discovery and even a possible bench trial over this issue, but also demonstrates how to use the contents of an administrative record in support of proving the impact of such a conflict. This is all strong stuff, and for many who thought the Supreme Court’s structural conflict of interest ruling in Glenn opened up a Pandora’s box or put us all on a slippery slope towards ever expansive, and more expensive, benefits litigation, here is the proof for that hypothesis.

To me, the most worrisome aspect of the decision, and one that sponsors and companies need to pay very careful attention to in terms of planning their benefit operations and obtaining legal services, is the Court’s very broad application of the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege. The issue here isn’t so much the conclusion that the exception makes internal legal discussions related to a claim subject to disclosure, but the line drawing it demonstrates with regard to when legal advice is, and is not, subject to disclosure. In short, plan administration – including benefit determination issues – are subject to disclosure and not protected. At the same time, though, what is protected is advice related to the protection of fiduciaries against personal liability, civil or criminal, when that advice is clearly distinct from the handling of claims under a plan and the administration of a plan.

Now the interesting thing about that distinction is that, as anyone who litigates breach of fiduciary duty or other ERISA cases knows, there is clearly some overlap between the two types of legal advice and there is not always a clear separation between the two. Certainly a fiduciary sued for misconduct is being sued because of events involving a claim and a plan’s administration, and thus legal advice rendered to the fiduciary falls somewhere in the middle of those two extremes. Further complicating this issue is a fact that the Ninth Circuit points out, which is that plan sponsors and plan fiduciaries often rely on the same lawyers and law firm for advice on all aspects of their plans, from formation to termination and everything in between, including the handling of claims and the representation of officers sued as fiduciaries.

In that latter instance of breach of fiduciary duty litigation against officers, it is crucially important for numerous reasons, as every litigator knows, to have a safe, secure and fully privileged attorney-client relationship. The standards enunciated by the Ninth Circuit, however, place that privilege at some risk in instances in which the same firm that has represented the plan in general is also representing fiduciaries or other company officers with regard to their personal potential liability. The best answer, for numerous reasons, to protecting those fiduciaries and officers, and maintaining the attorney-client privilege that is crucial to their protection, is going to be separating out the representation of such individuals from the routine legal work related to the plan’s formation, operation, administration and claims handling, and using independent, distinct counsel for the representation of such individuals. By segregating out and using separate, independent counsel for any issues related to their potential exposures, you make clear that the legal advice at issue involves privileged issues concerning the potential liability of officers and fiduciaries, which should still be privileged after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, and is not intermingled with or otherwise part of the broad range of legal services typically required by a plan, which the Ninth Circuit’s opinion holds is likely to be subject to disclosure.

In short, the pragmatic solution is to continue to use one firm for the overall handling of a plan’s various needs, but separate, independent counsel for any and all needs – whether involving litigation or only the potential risk of litigation or exposure – of a plan’s fiduciaries or the officers of the company sponsoring the plan.

That’s my two cents for now. The case is Stephan v. Unum, and you can find it here.
 

On the Problem of Remedying Errors in Providing Plan Information

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Equitable Relief , Fiduciaries
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Here is a great fact pattern that illustrates a number of recurring problems in ERISA litigation. In this case (Tocker v. Kraft Foods North America, Inc. Retirement Plan), decided by the Second Circuit last week, a mid-level benefits manager worked on accommodating the needs of a terminally ill plan participant, by working out an arrangement by which the participant could first receive long term disability benefits and then receive workforce reduction payments, rather than having to choose one or the other. Naturally, of course, since it turned into litigation, the arrangement did not work out without a hiccup, as it affected the participant’s pension credits. The participant sought to remedy that problem by use of a breach of fiduciary duty claim. The breach of fiduciary duty claim failed, however, because the benefits manager was found to have only been engaged in ministerial duties, and not fiduciary duties, and thus a breach of fiduciary duty action was not viable.

The case nicely illustrates and establishes the dividing line between fiduciary and non-fiduciary acts by executives of a company involved in running a company’s benefit plan, and the opinion’s first and best use will be in cases where that point must be established, particularly cases where one side or the other needs to prove that someone was, or was not, a fiduciary for purposes of a particular dispute. The decision is particularly on point with regard to the question of when does the provision of information about benefits render someone a fiduciary (the answer according to this decision is, effectively, never, although I am engaged in a purposeful bit of overstatement there).

However, it also illustrates a point I discuss in detail in an upcoming article in the Journal of Pension Benefits, which is the difficulty, under ERISA, of redressing problems in plan administration that are not merely denials of benefits clearly owed under a plan (and thus can be remedied under the denial of benefits prong of ERISA) and cannot be shown to involve fiduciary conduct. The dispute at issue in Tocker was exactly that type, and the plaintiff, despite having possibly been harmed by an operational misstep in implementing the agreed upon arrangement to coordinate the participant’s disability benefits and workforce reduction award, was unable to construct a viable cause of action under ERISA to address that problem and possible loss. The statute’s remedial rigidity had long been a problem in ERISA litigation over the years, impacting the ability of participants to address these types of problems. As I discuss in my upcoming article, this problem has likely been solved by the surcharge remedy recognized by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Cigna v. Amara: the best approach open to the plaintiff in Tocker today would have been to structure his claim as one for equitable relief based on the surcharge remedy, rather than as a breach of fiduciary duty claim. When his case began, though, well before the decision in Amara, this option would not have been open to him.
 

Small Employers and the Problem of Plan Compliance

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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I often think of the story of the cobbler’s kids having no shoes when I read about problems in a law firm’s benefit plan; lawyers spend their time fixing other people’s business problems, often to the exclusion of paying attention to their own business issues. Festering problems in a law firm’s 401(k) or other benefit plans fit this rubric well. This story, about a small Philadelphia law firm sued by the Department of Labor for operational problems in its 401(k) plan, illustrates the point nicely. As the story makes clear, the law firm does not seem to have engaged in any nefarious conduct, but to instead have dropped the ball on various technical, operational aspects of running a defined contribution plan, such as segregation of assets, timing of deposits, and the like. I have represented smaller and mid-sized law firms in disputes over their defined contribution plans, and I can tell you that, as this story likewise reflects, smaller law firms face the same burdens and problems in running profit sharing and 401(k) plans as do most other mid-sized and small businesses: the technicalities, the time demands and the complexity of doing it correctly are often beyond their internal capacities, and certainly outside of their core competencies. I have preached many times that the key to not getting sued, whether by the Department of Labor or plan participants, is an obsessive focus on compliance in plan operations; for many smaller businesses, as this story about the Philadelphia law firm reflects, this can only be accomplished by outsourcing to a competent vendor.

The Zeitgeist of Chris Carosa

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , Pensions , Third Party Administrators
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I used to be a fan, back in the old days when The New Republic was actually meaningful and influential, of its zeitgeist table, as it really did, in a glance, sum up what people were thinking and talking about, albeit in a humorous way. I couldn’t help but think of that this morning when I read Chris Carosa’s “FiduciaryNews Trending Topics for ERISA Plan Sponsors: Week Ending 7/27/12.” Its like a college survey course on one page of what everyone in the retirement industry either is or should be thinking about right now, from the costs of plans to fee disclosure to the coming tax wallop you are going to suffer to fix the public pension system to the misinformation, non-disclosure and outright confusion rampant in the knowledge base of plan sponsors and participants.

Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: The Privileged Position of Traditional Banks in ERISA Litigation

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , Preemption , Third Party Administrators
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All right now, its time to get back up on the horse – the blogging horse, that is. I didn’t actually go on vacation for the last month, believe it or not – I had a major brief concerning a piercing the corporate veil case against a corporate officer due not long after the July 4th holiday, followed almost immediately by briefing concerning the First Amendment rights of internet posters. Fun stuff, but it hasn’t left much, if any, time for blogging.

So I am now going to try to catch up on a number of items that I spotted – but was never able to find the time to post on – over the past month. I am going to start today with this story right here, about the Sixth Circuit ruling that ERISA claims against a bank failed on the ground that the bank did not qualify as a fiduciary, while the state law claims against the bank could not go forward because they were preempted.

Speaking last month at an MCLE seminar on the subject of litigating top-hat and other compensation disputes, I discussed one of my favorite conceptual points, which is the theoretical possibility in certain cases of prevailing, as a defendant, by showing that the ERISA claims fail on technical grounds while state law claims are preempted at the same time because the underlying fact pattern – whether or not capable of supporting successful claims under ERISA– turn on the terms of an ERISA governed plan. The end result is that a plaintiff would not be able to recover at all – or even have any viable causes of action – against the defendant. I discussed it, in fact, right here in this PowerPoint slide in my presentation, which referenced a case, Aubuchon v. Benefirst, in which I pursued that defense strategy. As my fellow panelists at the seminar and I discussed, it is a conceptually elegant and perfectly logical argument, but one that courts generally don’t like, finding that, much as the dissent did in the Sixth Circuit case referenced in the article, the circumstances either cannot or should not be interpreted in a manner that would leave the plaintiff with no viable cause of action under ERISA itself while simultaneously eliminating any state law rights by operation of preemption.

Here, though, the Sixth Circuit accepted that argument and found the plaintiff to have no viable claims, for this reason, against a defendant. It is interesting to note, though, that the defendant who benefited from that here is a bank. For whatever reason, banks – traditional, old-fashioned depository/lending institution type banks – make out very well in ERISA litigation when a party tries to bring them in, as happened in this case, as a functional or deemed fiduciary, based on the bank’s role in handling and distributing a plan asset; there is a long history of cases, although perhaps relatively few in number, placing such an institution outside of the role of fiduciary for purposes of ERISA litigation, when the bank is serving in a traditional banking role as a depository or lending institution. Add in the impact of preemption, and a bank that is merely holding the plan assets or lending against them (or supposedly only doing that, as the facts alleged in the case before the Sixth Circuit, as is often true in similar cases, could be construed as involving much more than that on the part of the bank in question) is in a very privileged position when it comes to defending litigation over its involvement with an ERISA governed plan.

The decision is McLemore v. EFS, and you can find it here.
 

A Bunch of Cliches About Scary Things (Or a Few Words on Why Fee Disclosure Isn't Scary)

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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Here’s a very nice piece on fee disclosure, as mandated by the Department of Labor, and the idea that it is to everyone’s benefit. I have long maintained that fee disclosure of the type at issue falls squarely in the ballpark of the old saying that sunshine is the best disinfectant, and that running from fee disclosure – whether as a plan sponsor or a service provider – is the intellectual equivalent of running from the bogeyman; there is, in fact, nothing to fear from it, for well-run plans and above-board advisors, and for those who aren’t yet those but aspire to be.

Why is that? Well, let’s run through the list of players in the 401(k) rubric. Plan participants obviously benefit from knowing what their funds costs, and from the opportunity to use that information to demand proper attention to fees from their plan’s sponsors, administrators and fiduciaries. Where is the downside to them? I can’t see one. And then there are plan fiduciaries. Plan fiduciaries should be avoiding fees that are higher than needed, both to protect themselves from fiduciary liability and to best serve participants. Now this doesn’t mean they are required to, and nothing in fee disclosure or the law governing fees requires them to, chase the lowest possible cost investment options. What it does mean, though, and which cases like Tibble make clear, is that they have to investigate and follow a prudent process directed at using the right investment option at the right price. The more information they have, the better they are able to do this; likewise, the more they are pressed by participants to do this, the more likely they are to install a good process to review these aspects of their plans and, correspondingly, the less likely they are to fall below their fiduciary duties in this regard. This all make them less likely to be sued for, or found liable for, excessive fee claims, and thus protects them from financial risk in running the plan. These outcomes flow naturally from the public disclosure of the fees inherent in a plan. And finally there are the investment advisors and other service providers. More than one such provider has told me that they already make this information available or have changed their business models to build around the open disclosure of this information, and that they believe their ability to compete both on transparency of and attention to controlling expenses is a competitive advantage for them. I have long believed that transparency works to the business advantage of the best players in this area, and aren’t those the ones who should be winning business? Just another side benefit of fee disclosure, and one more reason why, when it comes to fee disclosure, there is, to quote a former president who knew a thing or two about creating a retirement plan, nothing to fear but fear itself.
 

Trust But Verify: The Importance of Private Attorney Generals to Plan Governance

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Attorney Fee Awards , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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Here is a neat little story that illustrates a bigger point. The article describes the resolution of a Department of Labor lawsuit brought against a small company to recover approximately $100,000 of participant holdings in a profit sharing plan that was diverted to other uses. Its own moral is clear – plan sponsors need to remember that plan assets belong to the plan, not them – but one that is too often forgotten in closely held, smaller companies. The bigger story, though, is the one this case illustrates. I have written before about the idea that ERISA is really a private attorney general statute, one that uses the awarding of legal fees to a prevailing participant as a means of allowing individual participants to retain counsel and enforce fiduciary discipline, even in cases where the amount at risk – such as the one hundred thousand at issue in the article – wouldn’t otherwise justify either a participant paying out of pocket to hire counsel or a lawyer taking the case on contingency. And yet, as this case shows, there are real breaches, real problems, and real losses in many plans that require legal redress; this remains true even when the amounts at issue aren’t particularly large, as the losses are still significant to the participants who incur them. The Department of Labor itself does not have the litigation resources, relative to the number of plans out there, to litigate each and every such case, and has to pick and choose. Allowing recovery of attorneys fees allows those participants whose cases are not pressed by the Department of Labor to still bring breach of fiduciary duty actions and thereby enforces a level of legal oversight on plan sponsors that might otherwise not exist. The ERISA structure is, to a certain extent, dependent upon – and assumes the existence of – such private enforcement actions; they impose a level of discipline on fiduciary conduct that would otherwise be absent.

Plan Administrators and the Risk of Personal Liability: A Primer

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , ESOP , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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Often when I chat with middle and upper level managers of mid-size and larger companies who have been assigned the job of administering their employer’s 401(k), ESOP or other benefit plans, I wonder if they are fully cognizant of the risks of personal liability they are taking on, and whether they have made sure that, through insurance or otherwise, they are protected against breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits. I particularly wonder this in those cases in which it appears that, while they are taking on the role, they are simultaneously not high enough up the corporate food chain to clearly have enough power to control for and avoid potential problems in the plans they have been charged with administering. This leaves those administrators in the situation of being exposed as fiduciaries to personal liability for problems in the plan, while not having enough power to avoid or cure the problems. As fiduciaries, of course, they risk personal liability for the plan’s losses, and, as this excellent piece here explains in detail, it’s a liability they will have trouble ever shaking, even if their employer goes belly up and leaves them sitting there holding the bag.

From Webster To Seau and the Impact of More Medical Research on Repetitive Head Trauma in Football

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Employee Benefit Plans , Long Term Disability Benefits
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I spent some time thinking about whether to even post on this subject today, not wanting to feel on any level that I might be either rushing to judgment too quickly, or even worse, exploiting a tragedy in any way to make a point. But the suicide of retired football star Junior Seau perfectly captures a point that I have been thinking through for years, as the concussion/head trauma issues have played themselves out in the NFL and the media. Way back in 2006, I wrote about the ERISA case brought by former Pittsburgh Steeler great Mike Webster, and the Fourth Circuit’s decision to overturn, as arbitrary and capricious, the decision of the plan administrator for the NFL’s retirement plan to award Webster “the lesser of two possible disability benefit awards available under the league’s retirement plan,” due to brain damage he apparently suffered as a player. At the time, the Fourth Circuit reviewed extensive evidence in the administrative record that soundly refuted the administrator’s determination, and concluded that the administrator’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence.

I have often thought about the Webster case and that blog post in the interim, because in many ways the actions of the administrator, at least in the snapshot provided by the Court, seem so questionable that it makes one wonder how the administrator could have reached the conclusion that it did. The evidence from the administrative record, although debatable in terms of how to interpret it, focused on by the Court ran strongly towards attributing the player’s mental incapacity to head injuries from playing and to have begun close to, if not during, his playing days, thus qualifying him for the benefits he sought. Yet, even under those circumstances, the plan administrator ruled against him.

Among the possible explanations for how this came to pass is one – incompetence by the plan administrator – that I have always ruled out. The second is a corporate decision by the plan and its administrator to hold the line against brain damage type claims, which is at least certainly possible, even if doing so on a broad level instead of simply testing the facts of each particular claim against the plan terms would be a clear cut violation of fiduciary obligations.

The third possible explanation that has rattled around in my head for the last few years, as more and more research has been done linking diminished mental capacity to the repetitive head trauma suffered by football players, has come to me to seem the most likely explanation. This is the idea that a decade and more ago, when the events at issue in the Webster case occurred, there was scant, if any, medical literature soundly tying post-playing mental impairment to playing-derived head trauma. That is not the case anymore, as Andy Staple’s piece here on Junior Seau’s suicide discusses, but it was then. Plan administrators are often faced, in many contexts, with disability claims in which there is little if any significant medical research that would allow a firm conclusion on causation with regard to the disability at issue. In those instances, it can be very difficult for a plan administrator to make a call on whether or not the plan terms governing disability benefits are satisfied. When one compares what we know now about the effect of repetitive head trauma in football – a knowledge level that is still limited – with the state of the research a decade and more ago, you can easily imagine the NFL plan’s administrator being trapped by the conundrum, and being unwilling to credit the evidence of impairment submitted by Webster because the medical literature lacked support for linking it to his playing days in the manner needed to award him the benefits sought by him. This, to me, is both the most benign and the most likely explanation for the long ago ruling against Webster, which it took an appeal all the way to the Fourth Circuit to set right. The state of medical knowledge though, as Staple’s current piece and many others in the past few years have made clear, no longer allows for that same possible mistake by a plan administrator.
 

The Dam Breaks: Tussey v. ABB

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Class Actions , Employee Benefit Plans , Equitable Relief , Fiduciaries
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Tussey v ABB, Inc., an excessive fee and revenue sharing case decided on the last day of March after a full trial before the United States District Court for the District of Western Missouri, is a remarkable decision, imposing extensive liability for acts involving the costs of and revenue sharing for a major plan, on the basis of extensive and detailed fact finding. It is hard to sum up in a quick blurb, and I recommend reading it in full. However, Mark Griffith of Asset Strategy Consultants has a terrific write up of its its import here on his blog, and here is a nice case summary from Dorsey. Beyond that, I would highlight a few key points about the case, viewed from 30,000 feet (the case itself is going to provide grist for tree level, finding by finding analysis for some time to come).

First, and to me most interesting, is that it confirms several conclusions about excessive fee litigation that I have come to in the past and written on extensively, including my insistence that the pro-defense ruling in Hecker was not the last word on this issue (despite the desire of much of the defense bar to believe it was) but was instead the high water mark in defending against such claims. I argued in the past, with regard to the Seventh Circuit’s handling of this issue in Hecker, that the entire issue of fees and revenue sharing would look different than it did to the court in Hecker once courts began hearing evidence and conducting trials on the issues in question, rather than making decisions on the papers, and this ruling bears that out. Like the trial court decision in Tibble, another key early excessive fee case to actually reach trial, the taking of evidence by the court on how fees were set and revenue shared has, in Tussey, resulted in a finding of fiduciary breach in this regard. Tibble and Tussey reflect a central truth: when courts start hearing evidence on what really went on, it becomes apparent to them that plan participants were not fully protected when it comes to the setting and sharing of fees in the design and operation of the plans in question. To deliberately mix my metaphors, what Tussey reflects is that when courts start looking under the hood of how plans are run, they are not liking how the sausage was made. They quickly (relatively speaking, of course, since it takes a long time to get a case from filing through to a trial verdict) conclude that the fees were set and shared in ways that did not properly benefit the participants.

This particular aspect of Tussey is very important. Tussey involved a major plan and a market making investment manager and recordkeeper, applying what the court characterized as standard industry practices in some instances. It is therefore unlikely that the scenarios found by the court in Tussey to be problematic are unique to that case. Other excessive fee and revenue sharing cases that, like Tibble and Tussey, get past motions to dismiss and into the merits are therefore likely to uncover factual scenarios and problems similar to those identified by the court in Tussey.

What also jumps out at me about Tussey is the extent to which revenue sharing, which has often been characterized in the professional literature as harmless in theory, is strongly depicted as problematic as practiced with regard to the particular plan and by the sponsor and service providers at issue. I would have real question, going forward as a plan sponsor, as to whether it makes any sense at all to continue with revenue sharing. Better to just pay a fixed cost, than to risk extensive liability for engaging in revenue sharing. Absent that choice, the treatment of revenue sharing in Tussey makes clear the need for extensive, on-going, documented analysis by the plan’s fiduciaries of whether the level of compensation generated by the revenue sharing was, and remained at all times, appropriate.

Other aspects of Tussey worth noting include these two. First, the opinion provides as good an explanation, in detail, of what revenue sharing really is and how it works as you are going to find. If you want to understand what all the hullabaloo about revenue sharing is about, this opinion is as good a place to start as any.

Second, the opinion contains a nice analysis of one of the most misunderstood issues in ERISA breach of fiduciary duty litigation, namely the six year statute of limitations and how it applies to the implementation of a fiduciary’s decisions related to plan investments. A decision to change a plan investment takes time, starting with an analysis of whether to do so, followed by the steps needed to effectuate it, and eventually resulting in the final steps needed to permanently conclude the change. As the court explained in Tussey, the statute of limitations in that scenario does not start to run – for any of the losses related to that event – until the last act in that run of conduct occurred.
 

A Perfect Storm, ERISA Style

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Benefit Litigation , Employee Benefit Plans , Pensions , Retirement Benefits
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This is not, at this point, a novel idea, but I do take credit for being one of the first to blog regularly on the thesis that we are approaching, if haven’t by now already hit, a perfect storm when it comes to retirement benefits and ERISA. The perfect storm consists of a series of elements all coming together in the same place and time, which in this instance consists of the following. First, a move from pensions to 401(k) plans, with the corresponding shift of two key risks – investment performance and capital accumulation – from plan sponsors to participants, a change which most people paid little attention to for a long time, because pensioners were still the majority of people accessing retirement benefits, while the vast numbers who would have to instead rely on defined contribution accounts to fund retirements were still working; this kept both the impact of, and the fear of the impact of, that change relatively hidden for quite some time. Second, the impending boom (pun intended) in retirements of a generation whose retirements will be funded – or, actually, more often than not won’t be funded, if you believe the numbers – solely by 401(k) plans. Third, the swooning of the stock market contemporaneously with these events. Add it all up and you end up with a retirement crisis.

For ERISA litigation, you are already seeing some of the changes that this storm is rendering, and will continue to render, as legal rulings and regulatory initiatives occur that are making it and will continue to make it, roughly speaking, easier to sue for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA and to recover under ERISA if you are a plan participant. Doctrinal development of case law does not happen in a vacuum, and the easing of the restrictions against suing and recovering in ERISA cases is not happening in a vacuum either, but is instead being firmly influenced by the changes in the retirement industry and environment that are causing this perfect storm.

This occurs in a number of influential but indirect ways, which includes more cases being filed, often by more sophisticated lawyers, providing more opportunities for the legal principles at issue to evolve. One manner in which you see this is the shifting, sometimes almost glacially, of principles created in the case law during the days of pensions, when – in my view – courts paid less analytical attention to certain issues because most disputes concerned problems between sponsors and outsiders to the system, such as vendors or lenders, and did not directly affect the ability of participants to be paid their pensions; this is because, absent outright collapse of the sponsor, the obligation remained to pay those benefits regardless of the dispute at issue. The same, of course, cannot be said with regard to defined contribution plans, and thus courts are looking more closely at disputes in this environment than they did when confronted with similar, pension based cases 20 years ago. Indeed, we have clear direction from the Supreme Court that lower courts should reconsider doctrines established back in the long ago days of pensions when they arise in the context of defined contribution plans. Another manner in which this occurs is regulatory change – clearly, the Department of Labor’s flurry of regulatory initiatives related to fee disclosure and fiduciary status concern the need to tighten up the legal structure with regard to defined contribution plans in a manner that was not needed back when pensions walked the earth, as they increasingly no longer do. Each of these regulatory changes, in turn, opens up greater avenues for litigation and fiduciary liability, further changing the legal environment concerning 401(k) plans and ERISA itself. In this way, the perfect storm comes to affect ERISA litigation and liabilities.

Now here is a new wrinkle to add to the perfect storm, one that if true will just add to the impetus towards change described above: the possibility that the impending boom in 401(k) funded retirements will in and of itself depress stock prices. This will in turn simply accelerate the cycle, described above, by increasing the investment risk and capital accumulation risks that the systemic changeover from pensions to defined contribution plans has transferred to participants. The more risk of this nature passed to participants, and the more they suffer as a result of the outcome of those risks running against them, the more litigation, the more recoveries, and the more doctrinal changes you will see.

Put this one in a blog time capsule, and come back and see me in 20 years. I bet I will be right on this one.
 

On ERISA and the Potential Liability of Senior Executives

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , ERISA Seminars and other Resources , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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Susan Mangiero of FTI Consulting, who blogs at Pension Risk Matters (as well as at Good Risk Governance Pays) and is one of my favorite sources of information concerning the investment and risk management realities that lie behind the façade of ERISA governed plans, is, along with a few other worthies, presenting a webinar on Wednesday, March 7, on “The ERISA and Securities Litigation Snapshot: Things You Can Do Now to Minimize CFO and Board Liability.”

The webinar is scheduled to cover:

•Why ERISA litigation claims against top executives and board members continue to grow
•How securities litigation and ERISA filings are related and what it means for corporate directors and officers
•What ERISA liability insurance underwriters want clients to demonstrate in terms of best practices
•What steps the Board and top executives can take to minimize their liability
•When to Get the CFO and board members involved

My quick thoughts on each of these topics, and why they mean this webinar is worth a listen if you have any responsibility for the financial and liability risks generated by ERISA governed plans? Lets go in order.

Why do ERISA litigation claims against top executives and board members continue to grow? There a number of reasons, but here are three quick ones in a nutshell. First, the market losses suffered over the past few years by participants has highlighted the investment risks faced by participants, and made them look closely at others’ possible responsibility for those losses. Second, decisions such as LaRue and Amara, while not opening a floodgate, have nonetheless created an environment in which it is easier to structure and prosecute claims against fiduciaries on behalf of participants. Three, plans are where the money is; there is more potential damages sitting in a company stock plan than you can shake a stick at. Remember what Willie Sutton said about banks? None of this is changing anytime soon, and ERISA litigation claims against senior officers will continue to be a growth stock as a result.

How are securities litigation and ERISA filings related and what does it mean for corporate directors and officers? Short answer: over the past several years, court decisions and congressional action have made it harder to recover in securities cases, while the same is not true for ERISA cases. In many instances, ERISA theories allow another way to target stock losses without having to jump through the hoops that exist in a securities case. For directors and officers, this means they will face more ERISA suits down the road, including against them personally. They need to have the right business structures in place to protect them against such claims, and the right insurance in place if they are found liable.

What do ERISA liability insurance underwriters want clients to demonstrate in terms of best practices? Underwriting needs in this area in many ways overlap with the same steps that should be put in place to protect the fiduciaries against suits, to reduce the risk of a judgment, and to minimize the likelihood of a suit being brought in the first place, regardless of the insurance issues. These steps are what I have often called defensive plan building, which is the need for due diligence, active understanding of the plan, accurate communications with participants, developing expertise and/or hiring it as needed, and following the same level of sophistication and investigation that would be applied to any other crucial part of a company’s operations.

What steps can the Board and top executives take to minimize their liability? This pretty much concerns taking the same steps, mentioned above, that the company’s insurance underwriters will appreciate. Interestingly, this is an area of the law and of insurance where all of the incentives line up well. The same steps reduce the risk of liability, reduce the risk of getting sued, and likely reduce premium dollars all at the same time. There is one other key step that should be looked at closely though, when considering how to protect senior executives and Board members against liability under ERISA, which is to carefully think about who will be involved in the plans and in what manner; the selected ones will be at risk for ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claims, while the others can be carefully and deliberately kept out of harms way. This means, though, that this has to be considered in advance and the proper structures put in place to accomplish it; if you do this after the fact, you are bound to end up with a lot more potentially liable fiduciaries among the executives and board members than anyone at the defendant company ever expected would be the case, due to ERISA’s concept, embedded in statute, of the functional, or deemed, fiduciary.

When should you get the CFO and board members involved? Yesterday, if possible, and right now, if not, for all the reasons noted above.
 

An Entertaining Little Primer on Cash Balance Plans

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Employee Benefit Plans , Retirement Benefits
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All right, I am getting back in the saddle after a couple weeks off from blogging to recharge my batteries and tie up some key end of the year issues in a few cases. Not wanting to do too much heavy lifting on my first day back on the blog beat, I thought I would pass along, with minimal comment from me, this nice little piece on cash balance plans, and particularly how they might fit in alongside 401(k) plans in a particular business’ benefit plan structure. Anyone who follows the field knows that the rise of cash balance plans and their implementation, especially in instances where they have supplanted traditional pensions, has been rife with problems, both real, imagined, and litigatory (I may have just made up that last word, but still). Amara, of course, jumps to mind, but so do many other examples. The story I am passing along today, though, does a nice job of showing how, properly used, cash balance plans can be a force for good, not evil, to borrow a cliché.
 

Talking About Fees

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , ERISA Seminars and other Resources , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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Summer time and the living is easy. Well no, not really – which is fine, because nothing makes a lawyer (at least this lawyer) more nervous than having time on his hands. Time demands have, though, cut down on my posting since the 4th. Still, I have had time over the past few weeks to think a little bit about this educational seminar I spoke at that was hosted by Asset Strategy Consultants on the role of fees and revenue sharing in designing 401k plans. My talk focused on defensive plan building, or defensive lawyering in other words, which I define as the process of building out the investment options in a manner that will reduce the risk of getting sued on the theory that fees and expenses in a plan were excessive, or, if sued, of being found liable.

This particular seminar was very interactive, with a lot of give and take with the audience, which is something I like, not least of all because I inevitably learn something. What did I learn this time around? A few things, but the following stuck with me. First, it is important to remember that there are a lot of plans out there, and many of them are staffed by committed professionals working hard to provide participants with the best plans possible. One can lose sight of this in litigation, or even in reading about the various lawsuits, settlements and judgments involving 401(k) plans, because the contentiousness of those cases, along with the real and often significant breaches of fiduciary duty that occurred in them, can obscure that reality. However, there are many more plans – some of them represented at the seminar – where people are doing the work of really diving into the plan’s investment structure, and making sure it is optimal, from both the perspective of fees and the perspective of returns. As I discussed in my talk, fiduciary prudence requires weighing both of those aspects – as well as a whole host of others – in choosing investment options.

Second, when it comes to fees and expenses in investment options, there is a lot of expertise out there, and there really is no reason not to tackle this issue prospectively. Looking backwards, the issue was not on many sponsors’ front burners, and thus I have little doubt that there may be plans out there that never put resources into controlling fees and expenses. However, at this point in time, there is no reason for any plan sponsor to be ignorant on this issue and of the risk of liability it imposes going forward, and there is more than enough expertise out there that can be brought to bear to address such concerns. I would hope that, down the road, excessive fee and expense cases will eventually go the way of the Pterodactyl, now that plan sponsors have learned to pay attention to this issue and to address it.

Third, while I am not a skeptic of excessive fee claims (the math on the impact on participants of a lack of diligence on this front is undeniable), I am of revenue sharing claims, as a general rule. Unless and until revenue sharing in a particular plan is shown to actually impact the investment choices or returns of the plan participants, it seems to be a “no harm, no foul” type of problem. If, as I discussed at the seminar in response to an excellent question, the participants can get a strong return at low fees while at the same time plan costs are driven down by revenue sharing, I don’t see a basis for finding a fiduciary breach, even if the revenue sharing was not disclosed or poorly disclosed. Obviously, this is a best case scenario, but that is my general view of that subject. I did get a good dose of reality on this issue, though, from the presentation of Mark Griffith of Asset Strategy Consultants, who illustrated the extent to which certain revenue sharing arrangements can, over time, result in too much money being paid for administration, relative to the actual costs; at the same time, Mark did a nice job of emphasizing a fact which often gets overlooked when the lawyers start yelling at each other in court about revenue sharing, which is that the costs of administering a plan are significant and have to be paid for one way or the other, a reality check that should not be overlooked when regulators, courts and lawyers are considering the propriety, or instead lack thereof, of various revenue sharing arrangements.
 

Live Blogging from Bentley College . . .

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , ERISA Seminars and other Resources , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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Live blogging is usually used to mean that someone is attending a seminar and putting up posts about it while there. I mean it differently, that I will be talking live, about the topics I regularly address in my blog posts, at this seminar on May 10 hosted by Asset Strategy Consultants-Boston. The seminar is open to plan sponsors and their advisors, and I will be opening the event by speaking on "Hot Topics in Fiduciary Governance: Limiting the Risks Inherent in Selecting Plan Investment Options.”

Other speakers include Mary Rosen from the Department of Labor, as well as Todd Mann of AllianceBernstein Investments and Mark Griffith of the host, Asset Strategy Consultants-Boston. Mary and I spoke together on a panel awhile back in Boston, and her comments on the current focus of the DOL alone tend to be worth the price of admission.

Information on registering for the seminar can be found on this invitation, if you would like to attend. I hope to see many of you there next week.
 

From Studebaker to Stock Drops, in One Lawyer's Lifetime

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans
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How cool is this? I have talked in various posts and in seminars, webinars and the like for years about the transition from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, and how that integrates with the development of the law of fiduciary liability under ERISA. I am, in fact, outlining comments for a seminar later this week structured around that theme. Right in the middle of doing that, I look up and find this fascinating article about the death of pensions and the rise of defined contribution plans, only through the eyes of an ERISA attorney who began practicing in this field right after ERISA was enacted, and whose practice has covered the heyday of the pension, the vanishing of the pension, and the rise of the defined contribution plan. Neat story, and worth a few minutes to read.

On SPDs and Compliance

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans
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Compliance is its own reward. I think that’s my new motto for one of the underlying themes of this blog, which is the importance of strong operational compliance in running any ERISA governed plan. The return on that investment takes many forms, running from happier - or at least less disgruntled - employees, to better returns on participant and employer contributions, to fewer lawsuits, and to better outcomes on those occasions when a lawsuit is filed. Along those lines, here’s a neat post on complying with SPD requirements. At the risk of sounding harsh, which I don’t meant to, if you administer a plan and the information in that post is news to you, you need to focus more on compliance, and find at least a good consultant on the nuts and bolts of running your plans.

Handling the Impact on Benefit Plans of Corporate Acquisitions

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans
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Here is a fine overview of employee benefit issues that arise after a corporate transaction. Of interest to me in particular is the discussion of compliance problems - broadly defined - in maintaining or running off the seller’s benefit plans and in amending the buyer’s plan to deal with the acquired employees or the coordination of the benefit plans. I preach regularly on this blog and in seminars, webinars and the like about the sheer importance, from a litigation perspective, in focusing like a laser on compliance issues. Compliance issues can often lead down the road to litigation, and thus strong compliance is the best way to avoid litigation. Beyond that, though, a focus on compliance at the operational level is indicative of a well run plan, and a well run plan is less likely to make the types of errors - whether of compliance or otherwise - that result not just in litigation, but also in liability. Although other issues may be in the foreground of a corporate transaction, the centrality of compliance in these ways makes it important that the details of the benefit plans not get short shrift during or after the transaction. Indeed, in some ways it’s a penny wise, pound foolish issue; I know from my own practice a company can spend years in litigation and many thousands of dollars sorting out problems with benefit plans after a transaction, and avoiding that outcome through a little extra planning and foresight is always a worthwhile investment.

An Unfortunately Timely Topic: When Severance Programs are ERISA Plans

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans
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Nothing shows up in my practice any more frequently, particularly in this economy and over the last couple of years, than severance packages, and the question of whether a particular severance package program is governed by ERISA. Roy Hoskins, on the ERISABoard.com site, reviews this issue, and its application by the District of Maine under First Circuit law, in this excellent post, along with providing a copy of the opinion by the court. For those of you who may not be able to access the Board’s site for any reason, here is a copy of the decision itself, which is Sawyer v. TD Bank US Holding Company.

Pozek on 403(b) Plans

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans
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I always wondered what benefits whiz Adam Pozek did on Sundays, and now I know - he writes excellent blog posts on 403(b) plans, like this one right here! My own experience with such plans has concerned disputes over them, but Adam provides an interesting overview of the regulatory structure of the 403(b) plan as a whole.

Conkright, Discretion and the Supreme Court

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Pensions , Standard of Review
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Here’s a nice little story on Conkright, and the new Supreme Court session. As the article explains in a nutshell:

The issue in Conkright vs. Frommert involves how much deference a court must give to an ERISA plan administrator's interpretation of the terms of the plan. A group of Xerox Corp. retirees who left and then returned before retiring brought the suit. At issue is the method of accounting for lump sum distributions received by the employees when they first left the company when determining the benefits to which they were entitled at retirement.

In a review of the case, a three-judge panel of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled last year that a district court has no obligation to defer to a plan administrator's reasonable interpretation of the plan's terms if the administrator arrived at the conclusion outside the context of an administrative claim for benefits. It also held that a district court has “allowable discretion” to adopt any “reasonable” interpretation of the retirement plan terms under certain circumstances. The high court has not set a date for oral arguments.

I studiously ignored Conkright during the cert phase - we will discuss it in detail in future posts, however. Gut instinct right now, based only on what the Court did with its most recent ERISA cases? Expect a decision that narrows the administrator’s discretion and gives more freedom of interpretation to the court.  How's that for instant analysis?

Hecker, InsideCounsel and Defensive Plan Building

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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Hecker is the gift that keeps on giving, for either an academic or a blogger (or perhaps a blogger with an academic frame of mind). It presents a wealth of issues warranting further consideration, running from those commented on in my prior posts on the Seventh Circuit’s decision, to one I haven’t even passed on yet, namely the propriety from a jurisprudential perspective of using every trick in the trade, as the Seventh Circuit did, to go outside the complaint for extensive evidence that would allow the case to be decided on a motion to dismiss. It is fair to say that the circuit’s heavy reliance on those maneuvers (and I don’t criticize those tactics in general, as they are a litigator’s stock in trade in presenting motions to dismiss and I am one of those who thinks that, used properly, they provide an opportunity to focus a court on issues that should be decided in a lawsuit at the earliest stage possible) renders the opinion more akin to a law review article that now has the force of law - at least in the Seventh Circuit - than the type of factually based analysis that we normally think of with regard to a binding judicial opinion.

But that’s a topic for another day. What I wanted to pass along today was this excellent article - quoting yours truly extensively, although that’s not what makes it excellent - in InsideCounsel magazine this month on the Hecker decision. It is a well written, interesting report on the case, but I wanted to focus on what I am quoted on at the closing of the article, in which the author writes:

"Hecker is almost a quintessential law and economics opinion. It assumes the 401(k) plan included funds that charged the same [fees] as the market as a whole, and that’s all we need to know," Rosenberg says. "I would be surprised if many other courts are willing to just stop their analysis at that point."

Although Hecker provides a lot of protection for companies, he advises general counsel to assume the decision is just a baseline for ERISA compliance.

"Hecker didn’t impose a very high standard," he says. "Far and below Hecker is going to get you in a lot of trouble in a lot of different jurisdictions."

The defense bar, of which 80% of the time I am one, is very pleased with the decision and thinks it protects and/or validates much of what plans have done when it comes to fees in 401(k) plans. I am not so sure, and I think that prospectively at least it warrants more vigilance from plan sponsors, not less. To my mind, everything follows economics, whether its fashion, car design, house sizes (think McMansions), the social propriety of using company jets and, yes indeed, legal regimes. I have little doubt that with the baby boomer generation looking at becoming the first cohort to both lack pensions and have battered 401(k)s, the economic impact will eventually increase the level of performance and fiduciary expertise demanded of plan sponsors and those they select to run their 401(k) plans. It might take one year, it might take ten years, and I don’t know if it will come about by new regulation, statutory enaction or the development of case law, but it will happen.

Prospectively, as a result, plan sponsors and other fiduciaries can and should assume that, down the road, there will be much tougher looks taken at their 401(k) plans on issues such as fees than the very deferential approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Hecker; when that comes to pass, they will have been much better off having understood Hecker as presenting only the base minimum standard for the plans they operated, and having targeted a much higher level of participant protection in building their plans than Hecker seemed to them, today, to have required. After all, if you think about it, what really is so hard about looking closely at fees as part of putting together a 401(k) plan’s investment options from here forward, and documenting that this was undertaken, as an additional step in defensive lawyering and plan building, rather than just stopping at the Hecker level of analysis and conduct? It doesn’t take all that much - there are independent fiduciaries out there right now who will try to do it for you - but the legal protection in the long run, and the participant goodwill in the short run, that it will buy far outweighs the costs.

Blogging on the Business of Benefits

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans
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Readers of this blog have undoubtedly picked up on the fact that I like to litigate cases (even more to try them), and that the focus of my practice, including with regard to ERISA governed plans, is litigating disputes. But there are probably far more benefit plan attorneys whose focus is on keeping people out of litigation in the first place, by keeping plans and their operations in line with statutory and regulatory mandates. I just recently came across an excellent new blog both by and for exactly those lawyers, and you can find it right here.

A Handy Guide to the Oversight of Benefit Plans by In-House Counsel

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans
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If it’s a pleasure to read a piece by someone who gets it, whatever the it may be, it’s even better when that same person can explain it successfully to others. In this case the “it” is how in-house counsel responsible for ERISA governed benefit plans should conduct their oversight of the plans, and the someone is American Airlines’ Vicki D. Blanton, who has that exact responsibility at her company. She has written an excellent “how to” piece for in-house counsel who are charged with those responsibilities, and you can find it right here.

A Pile of Things on Kennedy v. DuPont

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans
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A lot of interesting things have piled up in my in-box during the past week and a half or so, when I have not had time to blog. I still think they are interesting, even after a few days of having them underfoot, so I am going to try to parcel out as many of them as possible over the course of this week, until I have either run out of them or out of time, whichever comes first.

I thought, for reasons of both vanity and timeliness, I would start with a couple of items on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v. DuPont. I am quoted in an article in the current edition of Lawyers USA discussing the case, along with a motley assortment of worthies, including the law professor formerly known as the Workplace Prof. It’s a good article, and for those of you who are subscribers, you can find it here; for those of you who aren’t, I am going to pass on my usual approach of (by putting on my copyright litigator hat) deciding how much of it I can quote under the guise of fair use, and instead send you to my post on the case here, which says pretty much what I think on the subject.

Also, I would be remiss if I didn’t point out that attorney Albert Feuer was kind enough to send along to me links to a series of papers and commentaries he has written on the Kennedy decision and the issues it raises (and, in many cases, does not answer, in both my and Albert’s views).  You can find them here, here and here.

Fun With Bill and Liv

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans
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Sorry, couldn’t resist - Bill being William Kennedy and Liv Kennedy being the named beneficiary in yesterday’s Supreme Court opinion, Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Investment Plan. After reading the opinion itself last night, I thought I would add a couple of comments to my initial impressions of the opinion, which I discussed in yesterday’s post. Initially, from a practical perspective for plan administrators, drafters, sponsors, and the like, the opinion is exactly what it should have been and, in fact, had to have been. I was chatting with a veteran benefits consultant who services retirement plans a while back about this case while it was still pending before the Supreme Court, and he commented that anything other than a clear pronouncement that administrators are to follow the express terms of the plan, rather than have to go outside the plan and weigh the implications of external events such as a divorce proceeding, would create a terribly chaotic situation. The Supreme Court could not have been more clear in its opinion that it was rejecting that possibility, repetitively reinforcing the idea that administrators act properly by relying on the plan documents; indeed, the ruling really required reciting this idea only once, but instead the Court built a long opinion around the repeated reinforcement of that idea.

Second, I noted yesterday that I wouldn’t have minded some clearer guidance on QDROs as part of the opinion, and on close review of the opinion I think we got some, although not explicitly. The Court, rightfully so, emphasized that the QDRO is the one time that an administrator faced with the divorcing participant and designated beneficiary scenario must incorporate court rulings outside the plan documents into the administrator’s application of the plan terms to determine to whom benefits must be paid. What has been more of an issue in practicality, in the courtrooms of the federal district courts, is to what extent a particular court order must perfectly comply with the statute’s QDRO requirements to be a binding QDRO for purposes of ERISA; many court decisions treat divorce decrees that are close enough to meeting the requirements as QDROs, even if they do not meet each and every statutory requirement perfectly, so long as there is enough there to convince a court that the participant and the ex-spouse intended for the ex-spouse to no longer be the beneficiary.

I would argue that the Supreme Court’s discussion at page 16 of the opinion, read in conjunction with footnote 12, indicates that the QDRO requirements must be perfectly matched by a probate court order for such an order to qualify as a QDRO, and that close - even if good enough for horseshoes - is not good enough for qualifying as a QDRO that would trump a beneficiary designation under a plan’s express terms. Why do I say this? In describing QDROs as the one exception to the Court’s preferred ideal of the administrator not having to go outside the plan documents to decide cases such as this one, the Court explained that QDROs require a “relatively discrete” inquiry that is based on a specific “statutory checklist” that “spare[s] an administrator from litigation-fomenting ambiguities.” The Court then proceeded to list the exact statutory requirements that must be satisfied for a divorce order to qualify as a QDRO. If, as lower courts sometimes appear to believe, close is good enough to qualify as a QDRO, then the issue is not a discrete, precise inquiry - as the Court depicts the QDRO inquiry - and is, contrary to the Court’s interpretation of the QDRO requirements, one that leaves, rather than spares an administrator from, “litigation-fomenting ambiguities” over the question. Indeed, while a plan administrator can make its own call on whether an order is a QDRO if the exact, specific statutory requirements must be satisfied for a particular order presented to the administrator in a particular claim to qualify, this isn’t easily done if something less than complete compliance with the statutory formalities can be sufficient to qualify as a QDRO. In that latter circumstance, whether the order is close enough to qualify is in the eye of the beholder, and you can be certain that the party that didn’t get the proceeds based on the administrator’s judgment call on this issue will sue over the question.
 

Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Investment Plan

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans
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Here’s the early word on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Investment Plan, which revolved around the issue of divorce decrees, the QDRO requirements of ERISA, and whether - in the absence of a valid QDRO - a plan administrator can rightly just pay proceeds to an ex-spouse of a plan participant if the participant never removed the ex as a beneficiary. I have only read this analysis of the case from SCOTUS blog (I will read the opinion itself tonight), but the answer appears to be the same as what most of us have always assumed to be the case: that in the absence of a probate court order that satisfies the statutory requirements in a particular circuit for constituting a QDRO, the money gets paid as per the express terms of the plan itself and any existing beneficiary designation, without regard to any extrinsic divorce agreement that might have mandated otherwise.

Simple enough, although in at least some circuits there is some ambiguity as to exactly what constitutes a QDRO, for instance in how closely the statutory requirements must be complied with. Perhaps the opinion, once I look at it, will shed some light on this question as well.

The Trend Lines in ERISA Litigation

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Benefit Litigation , Employee Benefit Plans
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I like when you sort of hit the zeitgeist in things you write and talk about. I mentioned in a post last week that I would be presenting a seminar to the ASPPA Benefits Council of New England on current trends in ERISA litigation, and I presented the seminar yesterday. As I gave the talk, a theme unfolded: namely, that the confluence of economic problems and the unsettling of many apple carts when it comes to the rules governing ERISA related litigation (a perfect case in point being the majority’s suggestion in LaRue that litigants and lower courts should feel free to reconsider precedents established in defined benefit cases when confronting disputes over defined contribution plans such as 401(k) plans) means we are looking at an expansion of litigation, perhaps in the overall number of suits and, if not, at least in the complexity, dollar value and expense of the suits that are brought. I noted this to be a particular issue with regard to stock drop and excessive fee cases, particularly in the current stock market meltdown.

Well, lo and behold, today here comes this report, from Seyfarth Shaw by means of Global Pension:

The Seyfarth Shaw Workplace Class Action Litigation Report showed last year, the top ten settlements for Employee Retirement Income Security Act-related (ERISA) class action cases topped US$17.7bn, a dramatic increase from the $1.8bn paid out in 2007 . . .“There is an explosion in class action and collective action litigation involving workplace issues. The present downturn in the economic climate is likely to fuel even more lawsuits, and the financial risks in this type of employment litigation can be enormous . . .” The firm said this trend was likely to continue, with particular reference to cases being brought over “stock drop” complaints – in which ERISA plan members brought action over the availability of employer’s equities as an investment option and “plan administration” cases, whereby participants brought action over ‘excessive’ advisory fees and other elements of plan administration.

Disclosure of Information: Where Securities Law and ERISA Diverge

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans
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Cool, what a nice treat to me for the first real workday of the New Year. I have always wanted a reason to link to the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance blog because, well, it just sounds so impressive (that plus it’s a really good read on all things corporate), and one of their contributors handed me the opportunity over the weekend. In a post addressing SEC requirements for online posting of public company proxy materials, the author - a Gibson Dunn partner and visiting professor at Georgetown - points out how these requirements differ from the notice requirements under ERISA:

Compliance with notice and access [rules under the SEC requirements] is not likely to satisfy the requirements for electronic delivery of materials under the U.S. Department of Labor standards for participants in ERISA-covered defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans and employee stock ownership plans. Section 404(c) of ERISA permits electronic delivery only if a participating employee has the ability to effectively access documents furnished in electronic form at any location where the participant is reasonably expected to perform his or her duties as an employee and for whom access to the employer’s information system is an integral part of the employee’s duties (e.g., a networked desktop computer at work), or if the employee provides written consent accepting delivery of information electronically. As a result, although an issuer may rely on notice and access for permitted employees and consenting employees, other employee participants should receive paper delivery of proxy materials.

You know what’s interesting about this? The focus on procedural aspects of providing information to plan participants (and others, with regard to the SEC rules). We could use an equal level of attention and agreement when it comes to the amount, type and transparency of the information provided to plan participants in particular, something more important than just the formal procedures by which it is provided.

On the Scope of the Attorney Client Privilege In ERISA Litigation

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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This really isn’t an instance of logrolling (or blogrolling, as the case may be), I promise, even though Roy Harmon’s post that I am passing along here refers to me and my electronic discovery post a few times; the subject of Roy’s post got my attention and led me to read it long before I realized the peripheral role I played in it.

Roy provides a very erudite discussion of a particular quirk and issue of some real concern in litigating ERISA cases, which is the scope of the attorney client privilege that exists - or often doesn’t - between a plan’s fiduciaries and its legal counsel, when engaged in a dispute with a plan participant. As Roy details, there often is no privilege in that situation that would prevent disclosure to the plan participant of legal advice obtained by the plan fiduciary. Its an interesting problem, one that arises in everything from determining the contents of an administrative record to be produced in a benefits denial case (i.e., is legal advice received by the plan administrator in deciding to deny benefits privileged or not?) to the extent to which the privilege can be raised in defending a deposition in a breach of fiduciary duty case. Roy’s analogy to multi-level chess with regard to these issues is apt, and illustrative of exactly the type of complicated gamesmanship that keeps litigators interested in the otherwise often dull interstices between trials.

A Thanksgiving Week Feast

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , Attorney Fee Awards , Benefit Litigation , ERISA Seminars and other Resources , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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Some of the more prolific bloggers manage to be prolific by posting short notes on various topics of interest written by others, which isn’t my usual style. But over the past week or so I have managed to back up a good stack of things that I have wanted to talk about in detail, but haven’t had the time to comment on. So in the spirit of a Thanksgiving host laying out a big spread, here’s a whole bunch of things at once:

First, here is a good follow up story providing more detail on Wal-Mart’s success in defending itself against excessive fee litigation, a topic I first discussed in this post here. This particular story, in PlanAdvisor, does a nice job of illustrating the point I made in my earlier post, which is that the court, in ruling in favor of Wal-Mart, did not focus on or analyze the propriety of the particular fees themselves, but rather focused on the method used by the fiduciary to select the investment options in question and whether that was prudent. Interestingly, the article describes the Wal-Mart investment menu, and it reads like one you would find in just about any 401(k) plan. Does this suggest that most plans are actually fine on this front? Or might it suggest that fiduciaries as a whole accept fees that are too high, and that perhaps comparing a particular plan’s investment choices, such as Wal-Mart’s, against industry benchmarks is not really the right focus for deciding whether the fees in a particular plan were too high? Just asking.

Second, here’s one court’s answer to an oft asked question: is a plan participant seeking benefits entitled to attorney’s fees for the administrative appeal portion of his claim?

Third, here’s an interesting webinar rounding up the Supreme Court’s treatment of ERISA issues during the 2008 term. The Court’s fascination with ERISA during the past year has been well documented and the biggest item of discussion in ERISA related media, and pretty much everything about those developments has been chronicled on this blog and a million other places. But if you haven’t seen it all enough by now, the webinar may be for you. Interestingly, one of the topics noted in the webinar is the Court’s involvement in a case, still pending and not yet decided, concerning waivers by divorcing spouses of plan benefits. This is the quickly becoming infamous Kennedy case, which to date has caught the eye for two reasons: first, many people have some question as to why the Court took on this case and whether it merited the Court’s involvement, and second, because of the Court’s decision to seek supplemental, post-argument briefing on the very basic issue of the extent to which plan administrators are bound - barring an effective QDRO - to the express written terms of a plan. As a very experienced benefits consultant recently commented to me, the Court is going to upturn an awful lot of apple carts if, intentionally or even (probably by accident) implicitly, they indicate that administrators are not strictly controlled by the actual written terms of the plan instrument. As a result, a case that started out as perhaps the least substantively significant of the ERISA cases taken up by the Court in the past year threatens to become one of the more disruptive to settled practices, in a manner similar to how the Court reopened much settled thinking on fiduciary duty issues by indicating in LaRue that rules long established in the defined benefit context may not hold true for all other situations.

Okay, that clears some of the backlog.

Some More Thoughts on the Primacy of the ERISA Plan Document

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Employee Benefit Plans , Summary Plan Descriptions
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Judge Gertner of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts has an interesting, if brief, ruling that is just out granting a motion to dismiss a severance pay claim under an ERISA governed plan. What caught my eye about it relates back to this post I wrote a few weeks ago, in which I pointed out the need, in litigation planning and counseling concerning ERISA plans, to resist putting undue emphasis on representations that are inconsistent with the actual terms of a plan, because the courts are likely to ignore such statements and to instead simply enforce what is written in the plan documents. The court’s opinion is another example of the trend in the case law in this direction. Although the court was not delving too deeply into this particular issue, the court noted that “in more recent cases, the First Circuit has held that courts should not look beyond the express terms of an ERISA-regulated plan unless the disputed term is ambiguous,” and that “[i]n ERISA cases . . . the central issue must always be what the plan promised . . . and whether the plan delivered." As I said before, any litigation strategy for an ERISA benefits case has to start with the terms of the plan, and not with extrinsic statements or evidence related to the plan’s terms or interpretation. The case is Walsh v. Bank of America Corporate Severance Program.

The First Circuit on ERISA Standing

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In 401(k) Plans , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , Retirement Benefits
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Very interesting case out of the First Circuit the other day on the question of whether former employees satisfy ERISA standing requirements with regard to defined contribution plans. Short answer is they do, but the Court’s analysis and discussion is an interesting open field run across a range of issues that are both explicit and implicit to any consideration of this question. One particular point, basically noted in a footnote, was of particular interest to me. I have discussed frequently in past posts my thesis that much of the evolution in ERISA law is and will continue to be driven by the economic effect on employees of the replacement of the pension system by 401(k) plans; this is partly because employees have become the persons at risk from investment mistakes, which they generally were not - barring complete failure of the employer and its pension plan - when employees were instead covered by pensions. In an interesting footnote, the Court addresses the distinction between the two types of benefits, and hints at the impact of that difference on employees:

Under a defined benefit plan, participants are typically promised a fixed level of retirement income, computed on the basis of a formula contained in the plan documents. See 29 U.S.C. §1002(35). The formula generally accounts for an employee's years of service and compensation level at retirement. Graden, 496 F.3d at 297 n.10. In contrast with a defined contribution plan, where the amount of benefits is directly related to the investment income earned in an individual account, the investment performance of the portfolio held by a defined benefit plan has no effect on the level of benefits to which a participant is entitled, provided that the plan remains solvent. See LaRue,128 S. Ct. at 1025 ("Misconduct by the administrators of a defined benefit plan will not affect an individual's entitlement to a defined benefit unless it creates or enhances the risk of default by the entire plan.").

The case is Kerr et al. v. W.R. Grace, et al.

Promises, Promises . . .

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Employee Benefit Plans , Summary Plan Descriptions
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Rob Hoskins over at the always interesting ERISABoard has an interesting story about a Second Circuit decision that essentially says “too bad” to a plan participant’s waiver/estoppel theory seeking benefits. The story is consistent with what seems to be a trend in which courts frequently fall back to the terms of the actual plan to decide a dispute, and seem unwilling to allow extrinsic, often but not always verbal, representations to participants to vary or even trump the written terms of the plan documents themselves. My own practice when it comes to participants who have been told one thing by a company representative and want to litigate the benefits they are entitled to as a result is to generally say that, yes, we can make that argument, but we will be a lot better off relying on the plan terms themselves and not on any sort of representation that might be to the contrary. It’s a platitude, to a certain extent, I know, but if you start from that premise, you will more often than not get the right strategy when mapping out litigation in cases in which representations were made that may have been contrary to the plan terms. To paraphrase that old handyman saw of “measure twice, cut once,” the way to think about these types of problems is plan terms first, estoppel claims second.

Life Is An ERISA Carnival, Believe It or Not

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans
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By the way, I meant to mention this on Monday, but a million different fires that had to be put out got in the way, so I’ll mention it today instead: Suzanne Wynn’s ERISA carnival from this past weekend surveys and provides links to a truly interesting range of posts on ERISA related issues. I’d recommend taking a few minutes and looking at the posts she collected, many of them from some of the best known, as well as best, ERISA and benefit related bloggers around.

The title of today’s post, by the way, is a deliberate reference to The Band's song from the early 70s.

Bowater, Preemption, the Wall Street Journal Law Blog, Massachusetts Health Care Costs, and Whatever Else Is On My Mind This Morning

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans , Health Insurance , Massachusetts Health Care Reform Act , Preemption
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If David Rossmiller can do a potpourri to avoid writing a full fledged blog post then, by gosh, so can I. Conveniently enough, I had some three small items on my mind this morning anyway, all of which I will mention here in one fell swoop:

? More on Bowater: For those of you who were interested in yesterday’s post about the First Circuit’s ruling in Bowater, concerning termination of a benefit plan and a foul up in executing it as part of a corporate acquisition, the ever watchful S.Cotus, who never misses anything on any subject at the First Circuit over at Appellate Law & Practice, has this in-depth review of the Bowater decision. S.Cotus delves into the labor law issues that were also at play in the case, in addition to the ERISA issue that I commented on yesterday. 

? I posted earlier in the week on the question of rising health insurance costs and how that was the elephant in the room that all of these state based attempts to reform health insurance were avoiding, and how that justified the preemption of those state acts in favor of a federalized and consistent nationwide approach to the problem. The Boston Globe has a detailed article today laying out the extent of the increase in health insurance costs just here in Massachusetts. The essence of the article is in the opening paragraph: “Massachusetts health insurers are predicting their rates will increase by about 10 percent next year for most residents covered through employer health plans, marking the eighth consecutive year of double-digit premium hikes.” Funny, but Massachusetts just implemented health reform legislation, so how can this be? The answer, I suspect, is in this post here.

? And finally, on a sillier note, the Wall Street Journal Law Blog is fascinated right now with preemption, posting several times on various applications of the doctrine in the last few days. Yet despite the fixation on preemption, they omit entirely what we all know is the most important and interesting application of preemption, namely ERISA preemption. While I write slightly tounge in cheek on this point, the truth is that, as we see with the attempts of states to legislate health insurance coverage in the face of ERISA preemption, this is in fact the one area of preemption that consistently affects broad numbers of everyday, real life people, as opposed to the smaller subset of directly affected businesses involved in the preemption cases discussed by the Wall Street Journal Law Blog over the last couple of days.

The First Circuit's Road Map for Terminating Benefit Plans

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Conflicts of Interest , Employee Benefit Plans
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Just a fairly short post on a technical ERISA issue that the First Circuit ruled on a few days ago, namely the steps that have to be followed to terminate or amend a benefit plan, at least with regards to the documentation and formalities needed to do so. In Coffin v. Bowater, Inc., the First Circuit provides a clear and definitive road map to follow to effectuate such a termination, and the court makes clear that veering off of that road map will result in a finding that the benefit plan has not been terminated. While the legal rule itself presented in the case isn’t all that gripping, although it is certainly a technical point that is important to know, the context of the case and some of the discussion in it are interesting in and of themselves, for at least two reasons. The first is the fact pattern of the case itself, which involved the failure of a plan sponsor and an acquiring company to effectively terminate a benefit plan as part of a corporate acquisition, causing them to later have to try to convince a court - unsuccessfully - to create some sort of common law exception to the rules established by the courts and ERISA that would excuse their failure to follow the basic requirements for a plan termination. Its simply interesting to see this important issue poorly executed in a complex corporate transaction, and the end result of litigation and additional liability that results.

The second is that the panel ventures into the question of the standard of review - de novo or arbitrary and capricious - in this circuit with regard to benefit issues and interpretation of plan language. As certain judges of the First Circuit have done in a couple of earlier decisions, this panel suggests that the time may be right for the First Circuit to revisit this question en banc and reset the law in the First Circuit on this issue, although the panel makes clear that doing so is not necessary for purposes of Bowater because the result would be the same under any standard of review that could apply. One wonders how much more pot stirring of this nature on the issue of the standard of review there can be before the circuit chooses a case to fully review and possibly revise the law in this circuit on this issue.

Misrepresentations Under ERISA Plans: Is There A Cause of Action?

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Equitable Relief
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Here’s an interesting case out of the First Circuit this week concerning an attempt to use an equitable estoppel theory to force a plan to pay supplemental life insurance benefits even though the former employee covered by the plan had not submitted the necessary health forms to qualify for that coverage. The case, Todisco v. Verizon Communications, involved a situation in which the now deceased employee was supposedly told that he could sign up for the additional life insurance benefits without submitting the necessary health information. The plan administrator refused to pay those benefits after his death because his failure to submit that information precluded such coverage under the terms of the plan.

After much wrangling at the district court (“wrangling” in this context being a euphemism for substantial motion practice), what remained was the plaintiff’s theory that she could recover the benefits on an estoppel theory based on the allegedly misleading statements made to the deceased at the time he elected the benefits. The First Circuit held that the theory failed as a matter of law, however. The Court analyzed the issue under both possible statutory causes of action available to the plaintiff, namely Section 502(a)(1)(B), which “empowers a ‘participant or beneficiary’ to bring suit ‘to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan,’ and Section 502(a)(3), which “allows a ‘participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary’ to sue ‘(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (I) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan."

The First Circuit held, however, that the plaintiff’s equitable estoppel claim had no home under either statutory section. It found that even though in common parlance equitable estoppel is understood to be an equitable remedy, it did not constitute equitable relief for purposes of ERISA under applicable Supreme Court precedent; for ERISA purposes, equitable relief has a very narrow and specific meaning, and the plaintiff’s attempt to recover compensatory damages only under an estoppel theory did not fit that meaning. The plaintiff’s claim was therefore not actionable as a matter of law under Section 502(a)(3). At the same time, however, the First Circuit found that the relief was not viable as a claim for damages - namely the denied benefits - under Section 502(a)(1)(B), because that section only allows recovery of benefits due under the terms of the plan, and the plaintiff's estoppel theory did not allege that the benefits were due under the actual terms of the plan, but that they were instead due under the terms of the plan as misrepresented to the deceased at the time he sought to obtain the coverage. The Court found that this claim did not fit the express requirements of the statutory provision in question, which limits recovery to benefits when the actual terms of the plan require them to be paid.

ERISA and Same Sex Marriage

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Arbitration , Employee Benefit Plans , Health Insurance , Preemption
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Here’s a great story out of Boston, by means of the Workplace Prof, that touches on several obsessions of this blog - ERISA, the federal arbitration act, and court review of arbitration awards. As the Prof explains in this post here, a federal judge for the District of Massachusetts is seeking amicus briefs related to whether or not the court should affirm or instead vacate an arbitrator’s finding that an employer could limit ERISA governed health insurance benefits provided to employees’ spouses only to spouses of the opposite sex. The arbitrator had determined that the benefits were collectively bargained for and that the limitation was appropriate under the collective bargaining agreement.

Now, presumably, the matter is before the District Court here on a motion by the losing party in the arbitration to vacate the award, given that the court is asking for amicus to address the question of whether the arbitration award and the employee benefit plan approved of by the arbitrator violate a clear Massachusetts public policy, given the state’s protection of same sex marriages. The court is inquiring as well into the question of whether that public policy, if it can trump the arbitrator’s award and thereby justify setting aside the arbitration award, is itself trumped by ERISA preemption, with the result, presumably, that the benefits offered by the employer have to be left as is.

There aren’t many states where this issue could really come into play, one would think, although I don’t know how many other states other than Massachusetts allow gay marriage, and thus can have employee spouses who are not of the same sex. Beyond that, the court’s response shows a serious involvement by the court in the question of whether an arbitration award was proper, which I have argued before in this blog is the appropriate approach of a court presented with a challenge to an arbitration award. While one might say the court is really reaching out quite far to address this issue, more than one would normally expect from a district court judge, I will take that any day over the situation I have noted in other posts on this blog, where judges sometimes seems to simply reflexively approve arbitration awards, or at least start with some sort of barely rebuttable presumption that the award should be upheld, both of which are approaches that I do not believe are justified under the Federal Arbitration Act. In addition, it is not particularly out of the norm in this particular federal district to reach out for help from the legal and business community in this way in this type of a case, as I can recall other judges in this district requesting amicus briefs on difficult questions involving the interplay of ERISA and federal or state anti-discrimination laws. Moreover, other judges, as discussed in this post of mine from a little while back, in this district are likewise continuing to struggle with the impact of ERISA on employers as they try to figure out how to structure their employee benefits when it comes to spouses, partners and other dependents, in this brave new world we live in here in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Incidentally, the underlying arbitration award is one that I discussed here, in this post, some time ago, in case you want to know more about the underlying controversy.

Can Partners Healthcare Systems Provide Different Benefits to Different Kinds of Partners?

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans , Preemption
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Judge Tauro of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued an interesting opinion this week as to the power, if any, of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination to continue to investigate whether an employer, in this instance Partners Healthcare Systems - which operates major teaching hospitals, among other operations - violates state anti-discrimination laws by granting employee benefits to the unmarried partners of employees only in cases of same sex partners and not in cases involving heterosexual unmarried partners. As the court described the facts, Partners Healthcare “offers its employees a variety of health and welfare plans, which it alleges to be regulated by ERISA. Under these plans, [Partners Healthcare] offers employee benefits to unmarried same-sex domestic partners of its employees, but not to unmarried heterosexual domestic partners. . . . [An] employee of [Partners Healthcare] who has a heterosexual domestic partner, filed a charge of discrimination.”

At issue in the court’s opinion was whether the federal court should enter an order barring the state agency from investigating or taking other action against Partners Healthcare for the alleged discrimination on the ground that such state action would be precluded by ERISA preemption; the agency responded that the doctrine of Younger abstention - one of those doctrines that most of us never come across again once we have finished our law school exams - actually precludes the court from intervening with the agency’s investigation, regardless of the possibility of ERISA preemption.

Where did the court come out? It concluded that, in this circuit anyway, abstention is not appropriate where there is a facially conclusive case of preemption under ERISA, and that to the extent the agency is investigating ERISA governed plans offered by Partners Healthcare, the agency is barred from taking action; at the same time, however, the agency was free to proceed with regard to any benefits provided by Partners Healthcare that allegedly discriminate in the manner charged by the complainant where those benefits are not provided under an ERISA governed plan.

Although I admit I have little knowledge of the underlying employee benefit plans at issue, I doubt the ruling leaves much, if any, of the employee benefits offered by Partners Healthcare open to the state agency’s jurisdiction.

The case is Partners Healthcare System v. Sullivan, available right here.

Summary Plan Descriptions and Discovery in ERISA Cases: the Latest from the First Circuit

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Long Term Disability Benefits , Summary Plan Descriptions
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The First Circuit issued an opinion in the case of Morales-Alejandro v. Medical Card System on Wednesday. The case, which involved a challenge to a denial of long term disability benefits, is noteworthy for two aspects. The first is that the case reaffirms this circuit’s reluctance to allow discovery beyond production of the administrative record in denial of benefits cases prosecuted under ERISA. The court pointed out that, in this circuit anyway, “ERISA cases are generally decided on the administrative record without discovery, and some very good reason is needed to overcome the presumption that the record on review is limited to the record before the administrator."

The second issue of note is that the court addressed the role of summary plan descriptions in ERISA plans and related litigation, and described the role they should play in a litigated dispute over benefits. In particular, the court declared:  

ERISA imposes an important requirement on plan administrators and insurers to communicate accurately with plan participants and beneficiaries. See Bard, 471 F.3d at 244-45. Part of the communication requirement is that the SPD provide certain information "written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a). Section 1022(b) specifies the information to be included in the summary. When the terms, language, or provisions of the SPD conflict with the plan, the language that the claimant reasonably relied on in making and proving his claim will govern the claim process. Bard, 471 F.3d at 245. The burden is on the claimant to show reasonable reliance and resulting prejudice. Id.

 

The Supreme Court's Next Words on Fiduciary Duties and Pension Plans

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , Pensions
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Here is a terrific and in-depth review of the underlying facts and issues in the pending Supreme Court case of Beck v. Pace International Union, which is scheduled to be argued later this month, and which involves the extent, if any, to which fiduciary obligations apply to a decision to terminate a pension plan by purchasing an annuity rather than by merging the plan into other existing plans. Thanks to Workplace Prof for the heads up about this on-line publication out of the Cornell Law School, a source that I don’t regularly follow (but of course, that is what I rely on the Prof to do, to follow academic sites like that in my stead).

On a side note, one of the things that I simply really enjoy about ERISA is that whenever the Supreme Court weighs in on an ERISA issue, we can look forward to years of - usually conflicting - district court and circuit court decisions trying to apply the Supreme Court’s ruling, giving us great material for litigating cases and for blog discussions.

Illusory Benefits and the Small Employer

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Pensions
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I have written before, including here and here, about the elements that must exist for a particular employment benefit to fall under ERISA and be deemed part of an ERISA governed employee welfare benefit plan. The requirements that must be met can become problematic with small employers, where compensation and benefit packages are often assembled on an ad hoc basis, often vary greatly from one employee to the other, and frequently are not well documented, as I discussed here.

Workplace Prof had another perfect example of this the other day, which the Prof discussed in this post, involving a pension benefit allegedly promised by a small employer that was, in fact, never established by the employer. The Prof points out something that all employees of smaller employers should do, which is make sure to take a gander at the employee benefit documents to make sure they really exist in the expected form; you don’t want to be trying after a particular employee benefit is denied to prove that the elements of an ERISA governed plan existed, and then find out the employer never actually funded the benefit or created any supporting paperwork at all.

Mike Webster to Ted Johnson: Are the NFL and the New York Times Kidding?

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Employee Benefit Plans , Long Term Disability Benefits , Pensions , The Hidden Law of ERISA
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I don’t want to turn this blog into a soapbox, and as someone who really likes newspapers, I also don’t want to join the Greek chorus of self-appointed media watchdogs that seems to make up much of the blogosphere. Some things, however, such as this article in the New York Times, call out for a skeptical and critical reaction. The article explains how the NFL has now created a program to provide some funding for long term, home or facility, care for former pro players who “have various forms of dementia,” even though the NFL insists that football injuries to the brain - multiple concussion syndrome, anyone, for those of you who follow the sport? - are not the cause. The article seems to credit the NFL for providing this help to former players - help that, despite the vast wealth of the league, is capped at $88,000 a year - and praises the idea that this problem is being resolved through this program rather than by litigation, i.e. by former players suing the NFL. Astoundingly, the article describes the program as addressing an unmet need because, and I quote the Times here on this, “former players who have dementia do not qualify for the N.F.L.’s disability insurance program, because neither the league nor the union consider their conditions football-related, a stance that has been cast in doubt by several scientific studies.”

And yet, as I discussed in this post several months ago, the family of the late Pittsburgh Steelers center Mike Webster litigated that exact issue for years, finally defeating the NFL, the players association and the plan before the Fourth Circuit court of appeals, to recover benefits under the league’s ERISA governed pension and disability system for exactly this type of injury. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion, in fact, was a pretty powerful condemnation of the roadblocks that had been tossed in Webster and the estate’s path in their attempt to obtain the benefits.

Which brings me to a couple of points that should be kept in mind in reading the Times article and considering the value of the NFL’s new program that the article praises. First, I suspect that the pension plan/disability plan system that the Webster family targeted provides far greater benefits than does this separate plan discussed in the article. If so, the idea that former players should pursue help under that program, rather than through the pension plan, is a disservice to retired players. Second, again if I am right about the greater benefits available under the pension/disability plan, then one has to wonder whether the separate NFL plan discussed in this article, although commendable for providing some help to aging players, actually serves as something of a Trojan horse (not a perfect analogy, I know) that, intentionally or otherwise, draws retired players away from seeking the larger payouts of the pension/disability system and instead to this plan. And third, given that a leading federal court of appeals with a significant track record in ERISA cases has already found that the NFL’s pension and disability plan actually does cover brain injuries of this type, the article is simply off-base in stating that dementia falls outside of the plan.

The article notes the relevance of this issue to some high profile recent players, such as Ted Johnson of the Patriots, 34, whose doctors”said he was exhibiting the depression and memory lapses associated with oncoming Alzheimer’s.” Those players should, notwithstanding this article, first be looking to the NFL’s pension and disability plans, particularly in light of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in the Webster case, for compensation and care, before settling for the limited assistance provided by this alternative plan.

And finally, this whole matter brings me back to an issue I have talked about in the past, about questionable decision making by courts concerning what decisions to publish and what ones not to publish in the ERISA context. The Fourth Circuit’s decision in the Webster case, to my recollection, was not marked for publication (you can locate it, however, at my earlier post on that case). Yet, really, the scope of NFL plan benefits for this type of mental injury had never been resolved before, and it remains, as this article in the Times reflects, not well understood, making this an opinion that probably should have been published, and should not have been part of what I have called in the past “the hidden law of ERISA.”

The Attorney-Client Privilege, ERISA and the Administrative Record

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries
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No doubt at least some of you have noticed my fixation on the attorney-client privilege, and where its borders should be drawn when a party’s counsel plays a central role in the events that may or may not trigger insurance coverage or show bad faith. I have the same sort of cartographer’s obsession with mapping where those borders should be when the administrator of an ERISA governed plan makes a benefit determination based on the investigation and legal conclusions of counsel. What happens to the privilege, for instance, if a company’s in-house counsel interprets the plan’s terms and applies them to the facts, thereafter recommending to the plan administrator what decision to render on a claim? And what happens if the plan administrator then adopts that recommendation as its determination? One can picture the same scenario involving reliance on outside counsel to do the same work.

Well, as this well-developed post from the Health Plan Law blog discusses, the plan administrator can delegate in this manner to counsel, and adopt counsel’s findings, at least as a general statement. But what effect would doing so have on the attorney-client privilege that would otherwise normally attach to communications between counsel and a client? Health Plan Law has this to say on that topic:

The question is this: while a plan may consistent with exercise of fiduciary discretion delegate duties as to claim investigation to legal counsel, is there a concomitant sacrifice in scope of privileged communications?
A fundamental legal principle states that the attorney-client privilege may be waived expressly or by implication. Implied waivers are consistently construed narrowly.See, In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 452 (6th Cir.2005). On the other hand, “an attorney-client communication is placed at issue when the party makes an assertion that in fairness requires examination of protected communications.” Clevenger v. Dillard’s Department Stores, Inc. Slip Copy, 2007 WL 27978 (S.D.Ohio 2007) (Dillard’s defendants impliedly waived the privilege for communications with legal counsel related to plan termination). The concern raised here is succinctly stated as follows: ‘the attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword.’ United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir.1991)
And then again, to what extent does privilege apply in fiduciary matters in any event? In this connection consider the following regarding the “fiduciary exception”:
Most courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have recognized the existence of a fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege. In J.H. Chapman Group, Ltd. v. Chapman, No. 95 C 7716, 1996 WL 238863 (N.D.Ill. May 2, 1998), for example, the court explained that “[t]he fiduciary duty exception ‘is based on the notion that a communication between an attorney and a client is not privileged from those to whom the client owes a fiduciary duty.”See also Bland v. Fiatallis North America, Inc., 401 F.3d 779, 787 (7th Cir.2005) (recognizing fiduciary exception in the ERISA context).

On more of a concrete and less abstract level, you can think about this in terms of the administrative record; there are exceptions, but in most circumstances and in most courts, the administrative record would make up the universe of evidence that the court can consider in ruling on a challenge to an administrator's determination of a particular claim.  Generally speaking, the administrative record is to contain the information relied upon or considered by the administrator in making that determination.  But what about attorney advice received by the administrator and relied upon by it?  The scope of the attorney-client privilege can impact whether or not that advice should be part of the administrative record.

More on Top Hat Plans and the Alexander Decision

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans , Retirement Benefits
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Just a brief note today on something interesting that caught my eye concerning a topic, top hat plans, that we have discussed a fair amount recently. Here is a nice detailed technical discussion of top hat plans from the BNA Pension and Benefits Blog. The discussion is centered around the Alexander case out of the federal district court that I talked about here, and on which the post’s author apparently served as a non-testifying expert.

Health Savings Accounts, Summary Plan Descriptions and Other Things

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Employee Benefit Plans , Fiduciaries , Retirement Benefits , Summary Plan Descriptions
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A few short notes of interest from a weekend of reading:

• Jerry Kalish has nice things to say about (and agrees with) my recent post concerning the Second Circuit’s decision - correct in my view - precluding summary plan descriptions from trumping the actual plan terms.

• I don’t know quite what to say about this article from yesterday’s Boston Globe about town retirement boards and their travel expenses, other than to note that if you don’t want to face exposure as a fiduciary, this type of conduct probably isn’t the way to go about it.

• And finally, WorkPlace Prof collected this information about whether health savings accounts constitute employee benefit plans governed by ERISA. He cites a report to the effect that they do not. Of particular interest, the post points out that employer contributions to the accounts will not necessarily transform them into ERISA governed plans, because employer contributions alone do not in and of themselves render a plan an ERISA governed plan. I have discussed before the totality of factual circumstances that are to be considered in the First Circuit to determine whether a benefit is an ERISA governed plan, and the fact that the source of funding alone is not determinative.

Employee Welfare Benefit Plans and the Small Employer

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Long Term Disability Benefits , Preemption
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Preemption is a tough defense to get around, particularly in the First Circuit, where it is taken quite seriously and numerous decisions expressly declare particular state law causes of action to be preempted by ERISA. One clever response to this problem, at least when the facts will allow the argument, is to try to sidestep any fight over preemption itself by arguing that the benefit at issue was not even provided by an employee welfare benefit plan and that as a result, ERISA does not apply and state law claims over the denial of the benefits are actionable. There is more room to maneuver on such an argument than in a battle over preemption, because the test recognized in the First Circuit for determining whether a benefit was in fact provided by an employee welfare benefit plan is mutlipronged, fact based, and, on at least some elements of the test, rather amorphous. At the same time, however, it doesn't take much for an employee benefit to qualify as an ERISA governed employee welfare benefit plan, at least in this circuit.

The test is laid out and then explored in great detail in a recent decision, James O'Leary v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co., by Judge Saylor of the United States District Court here in Massachusetts. The court explained that "an employee welfare benefit plan has five elements: (1) a plan, fund, or program (2) established or maintained (3) by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, (4) for the purpose of providing. . . disability. . . benefits (5) to participants or their beneficiaries," and that these are factual inquiries. In many instances involving larger employers, the application of these factors and the conclusion that should be reached are transparent from the outset; even without looking closely at the factors, there is little room to doubt that, for example, a large company's disability benefits plan for its employees satisfies these elements and is an ERISA governed plan.

What made the application of these factors interesting in the case before the court was the particular dynamic generated by the fact that it was a small employer and many of the facts at issue with regard to the employment benefit in question were unique to that one employee who was denied the benefits in question and was filing suit. This fact pattern took the case out of the realm of if it "looks like a duck and walks like a duck, its an employee welfare benefit plan," and placed it instead in the realm of coverages that might just be personal to the employee rather than part of an ERISA governed plan. It wasn't, the court eventually concluded, but the analysis in reaching that point is informative.

It's a bird, it's a plan . .

Posted By Stephen D. Rosenberg In Benefit Litigation , ERISA Statutory Provisions , Employee Benefit Plans , Standard of Review
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This being - roughly - the start of a new month, I engaged in my usual habit of reviewing any ERISA decisions issued in the past month by the courts in the First Circuit, just to make sure I didn't miss anything while busy with the usual run of business. As it turns out, on July 20th, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island issued its opinion in Holm v. Liberty Mutual Life Assurance Co. and Bank of America , a case in which an employee who had resigned from a company without first seeking disability benefits thereafter sought them later. In many ways, this is a traditional denial of benefits decision in this circuit, with the court finding that the plan granted the administrator sufficient discretion to invoke the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and then finding that under that standard the administrator's denial of benefits must be upheld since there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the decision. The court does offer some good language, and a good synopsis of the circuit's most popular decisions, on these points, and, frankly, you can tell on one read of the opinion that the outcome should have been the same regardless of the level of review applied by the court.

What makes the decision more interesting than most, however, is that the case presented the somewhat unique situation of the defendants raising the question of whether the benefit was even provided under an ERISA governed plan, and the court provides a nice summary of the law in this circuit for making that determination. As per the court (I have left out the cites):

ERISA provides a broad definition for employee benefit plans, and this definition has been divided by the First Circuit into "five essential constituents:"
(1) a plan, fund or program (2) established or maintained (3) by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both (4) for the purpose of providing medical, surgical, hospital care, sickness, accident, disability, death, unemployment or vacation benefits ... (5) to participants or their beneficiaries. . . . In determining whether a specific plan is an ERISA plan, the First Circuit reviews the extent of the employer's role in administering the benefits. Those obligations are the touchstone of the determination: if they require an ongoing administrative scheme that is subject to mismanagement, then they will more likely constitute an ERISA plan; but if the benefit obligations are merely a one-shot, take-it-or-leave-it incentive, they are less likely to be covered. Particularly germane to assessing an employer's obligations is the amount of discretion wielded in implementing them.

The court had little trouble concluding that the benefit plan in question was "clearly an employee benefit plan as defined by the ERISA statute" in light of the actual facts of the matter.