Here’s an interesting case for you. Here in the First Circuit, we have plenty of case law making clear that theories of liability that serve as alternative enforcement mechanisms to those set forth in ERISA itself are preempted. What about the circumstance where the cause of action is not necessarily an alternative enforcement method but would nonetheless require the fact finder to reference the terms of an ERISA governed employee benefit plan to determine whether or not the plaintiff’s state law cause of action is viable? Is there a point at which the state law claim becomes too remote from the existence of the ERISA governed employee benefit plan for it to be preempted? Well sure, but it is only at a great remove from the employee benefit plan itself. The standard for determining this is a simple test – does determining the cause of action require considering or interpreting the terms of the plan? If so, the state law cause of action is preempted.
This principle is nicely illustrated by a new decision, out of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, in which the plaintiff sought to recover emotional distress for tortious mishandling of her claim for benefits, by arguing that “resolution of her emotional distress claim would not require an analysis of ERISA plan documents” and therefore the state law claim could proceed. The District Court rejected the argument because, as a factual matter, deciding the plaintiff’s claim would require the court “to determine, among other things, any deadlines or other time frames set out in the plan documents. It would also be necessary, it would seem, to know the scope of the plan’s coverage, in order to determine whether [plaintiff’s] claims were mainstream or borderline or meritless, which, presumably, would have a bearing on the time reasonably necessary for [the defendant] to approve or reject them.” The case, Polley v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, does a nice job of illuminating this aspect of preemption analysis – namely, the implications for preemption of any need under a state law cause of action to interpret the terms of an ERISA governed plan. I pass it along as useful reading on that point, and a handy, dandy case to cite to quickly for the principle.